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Textualism and Tax Shelters 
By  
Noël B. Cunningham* & James R. Repetti** 
 
Introduction 
A substantial debate about the approaches employed by courts to interpret statutes 
and regulations has developed during the last decade.  Some have argued that the search 
for a statute’s meaning and purpose should focus on the text, itself, and should not 
include consulting legislative history.1  In contrast, others have argued that it is difficult 
to determine the meaning of a statute without consulting legislative history to determine 
the legislature’s purpose for the statute.2 
The debate about the appropriate method for interpreting statutes underlies a crisis 
in the administration of tax law.  The recent proliferation of tax shelters3 has at least in 
part been facilitated by the ascendancy of textualism.  Our conversations with 
practitioners indicate that tax advisors have become more aggressive in structuring 
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1 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting The Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (Amy Gutman ed., 
1997). 
2 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374–76 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1999). 
3 For various reports on the proliferation of tax shelters, see, e.g., DEPT. OF TREAS., THE PROBLEM OF 
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:  DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 2–3 (July 1999), 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/taxpolicy/library/ctswhite.pdf; David Cay Johnston, Big 
Accounting Firm’s Tax Plans Help the Wealthy Conceal Income,  N. Y. TIMES, June 22, 2002, at A1; Janet 
Novack &  Laura Sanders, The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, FORBES MAGAZINE, Dec. 14, 1998, at 198.   
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transactions that comply with the form of the tax statutes even though the transactions 
may be highly questionable in light of the legislation’s history or underlying purpose.  
The result has been a cottage industry where investment banks and accounting firms 
market tax shelters that triumph in form, but not substance, at the expense of the fisc.  
Because most tax shelter activity is hidden,4 it is difficult to ascertain its revenue impact.5  
It is estimated that tax shelters reduced tax revenues by approximately $10 to $24 billion 
in 1999.6  In addition, practitioners and government officials worry that the use of 
shelters is eroding confidence in the tax system.7  The Department of Treasury has stated:  
Corporate tax shelters breed disrespect for the tax system – both by the people 
who participate in the tax shelter market and by others who perceive unfairness.  
A view that well-advised corporations can and do avoid their legal tax liabilities 
by engaging in these tax-engineered transactions may cause a ‘race to the 
bottom.’  If unabated, this will have long-term consequences to our voluntary tax 
system far more important than the revenue losses we currently are experiencing 
in the corporate tax base.8 
 
Although the majority of courts have not adopted textualism, the legal 
community’s acceptance of textualism as a plausible method of interpretation has 
                                                 
4 Most tax shelters are organized as partnerships that are not subject to tax, but instead flow-through their 
losses and income to partners.  In 2002, the IRS audited only 0.39 percent of the tax returns for flow-
through entities such as partnerships.  STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS 
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998  37 (JCX-53-03) (May 19, 2003). 
5 See Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem: Possible Solutions, and a 
Reply To Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 342–46 (2002) (noting that data about revenue losses 
from tax shelters is lacking and is difficult to obtain).   
6 See Martin Sullivan, A Revenue Estimate for Corporate Tax Shelters, 85 TAX NOTES TODAY 981 (Nov. 
22, 1999) (estimating $10 billion shortfall in 1999); Martin Sullivan, Testimony Before House Ways and 
Means Committee on Corporate Tax Shelters, Tax Notes Doc. 1999-3951 (Nov. 10, 1999) (Reporting 
shortfall in corporate tax revenues of between $12 and $24 billion).  See generally Mihir Desai, The 
Corporate Profit Base, Tax Sheltering Activity and the Changing Nature of Employer Compensation, 
NBER Working Paper No. 8866 p. 3 (April, 2002) (noting that a difference of approximately $154.4 billion 
between corporate income reported for tax purposes and book income reported on financial statements 
cannot be explained); DEPT. OF TREAS., supra note 3, at 31 (stating that one tax shelter uncovered by the 
IRS could reduce corporate tax receipts by $13 billion over a five–year period). 
7 DEPT. OF TREAS., supra note 3, at 3. 
8 Id. 
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dramatically affected the practice of tax law.  As discussed in this article,9 taxpayers often 
invest in tax shelters based upon the opinion of counsel assessing the probability that the 
desired tax results from the transaction, if challenged, will be sustained.  These opinion 
letters are essential to attract investors because they protect taxpayers from various 
penalties that otherwise might be imposed if the Service successfully challenges the 
transaction.  Under the textualist approach, it is much easier for an attorney to write a 
favorable opinion for transactions that are designed to comply with the letter of the law, 
but not its spirit, for at least two reasons.  First, the attorney is permitted to ignore, or at 
least downplay, any legislative history that would argue against, or undercut, the desired 
tax results.  Second, under a textualist approach, it is arguable that various well-accepted 
judicial doctrines, such as the business purpose doctrine, are suspect.  At the extreme, a 
textualist might argue that these doctrines are the product of judicial activism and either 
should no longer be followed, or at a minimum should not be extended into new areas of 
the law. 
Tax shelter promoters have exploited the move towards textualism by designing 
transactions that comply with the letter of the law, but that generate results clearly never 
contemplated by Congress or the Treasury.  Some promoters believe that the more 
detailed and complex the underlying law is, the more likely it is that a transaction 
complying with the letter of the law will be respected.  One area in tax law that is 
particularly detailed and complex is Subchapter K, the partnership tax provisions.  
Subchapter K also has several special rules not otherwise available in the Internal 
Revenue Code.  It is, therefore, not surprising that Subchapter K has become the vehicle 
                                                 
9 See infra notes 122–144 and accompanying text. 
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of choice for a wide variety of abusive transactions.10  Transactions are designed so that a 
partnership is created or joined just to take advantage of these special rules (“reverse 
engineered” transactions).  In an attempt to stem the tide, the IRS adopted a general anti-
abuse rule for Subchapter K.11   This rule requires that the provisions of Subchapter K be 
interpreted consistent with “the intent of subchapter K.”  Oversimplified, the regulations 
assert that there is an overall legislative intent underlying Subchapter K, and if a 
partnership is formed or availed of in connection with a transaction to substantially 
reduce federal taxes in a manner inconsistent with this intent, the transaction may be 
recast.  The regulations make clear that for a transaction to pass muster, doctrines that 
originated with the judiciary, i.e., the requirements of a business purpose, economic 
substance, and substance over form, must be taken into account.  In addition, the 
regulations require that the purposivist method of statutory interpretation be used to 
interpret Subchapter K. 
The anti-abuse regulations caused an unprecedented furor within the tax bar.12  
They have been severely criticized by academics and practitioners alike on a variety of 
bases, the most damning of which is that Treasury lacked the authority to promulgate the 
rules and that therefore they are not valid.13  Indeed, it is fair to say that there is a general 
consensus that the partnership anti-abuse regulations are an extreme example of 
administrative overreaching. 
                                                 
10 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on the Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, 64 TAX NOTES 
233, 234 (1994). 
11 An anti-abuse regulation allows the government to “override the literal words of a statute…if the 
taxpayer enters into or structures a transaction with a principal purpose of reducing tax liability in a manner 
contrary to the purposes of the statute . . . .” David A. Weisbach, Costs of Departures from Formalism: 
Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1999). 
12 See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra note 171. 
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We disagree.  Although we do not endorse all the policy choices in the anti-abuse 
regulations, we believe that they are not only valid, but suggest a way in which 
transactions that are the product of reverse engineering can and should be attacked, both 
within and without Subchapter K.  Initially, it may seem inappropriate for Treasury to 
instruct the judiciary on how and when the courts should apply judicial doctrines and 
what tools they should use in interpreting statutes.  After all, as every law student knows, 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”14  Where does Treasury get the authority to instruct a court as to which method of 
interpretation it should use to interpret a tax statute?  On reflection, however, we believe 
that Treasury acted well within its authority under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,15 and was simply filling a gap in the statute left by 
Congress. 
The judicial doctrines that are implicit in the “intent of subchapter K” were well-
developed when Subchapter K was first enacted in 1954 and continue to be applied in a 
variety of contexts by the courts.16  At that time, however, it was not clear exactly how 
and when these doctrines should be applied in the context of Subchapter K.  There is little 
doubt Congress could have clarified this issue by statute.17  It could have insisted that 
these doctrines (or variations thereof) be applied with full force, or it could have 
forbidden their application altogether.  Congress, however, chose not to address this 
issue, leaving a gap in the statute.  Under current administrative law principles, this 
                                                 
14 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
15 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  See infra notes 178–247 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chevron. 
16 See infra notes 238–241 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 241–245 and accompanying text. 
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silence constitutes an implied delegation of authority by Congress to Treasury to fill that 
gap.18  
In addition to being valid, we also believe that, as a general proposition, it is 
sound tax policy to use broad standards to administer the tax law.19  Historically this had 
been accomplished by the courts through the use of these judicial doctrines.  Although 
the ascendancy of textualism cast doubt on the continuing viability of the doctrines, 
Treasury eliminated that doubt by promulgating these regulations (if valid), and requiring 
lawyers and courts to consider the “intent of subchapter K.”  This approach allows the 
IRS to use broad standards to administer the tax law in place of a collection of narrow 
rules that must be constantly changed in a hopeless attempt to keep pace with the latest 
tax gimmick.  To assure proper consideration of these doctrines by tax advisors, we 
recommend that the IRS amend its standards for practice to require advisors opining on 
the validity of tax shelters to apply the doctrines to the specific ecoonomic facts of the tax 
shelter in their opinion letter.  If the advisors are assuming economic facts based on the 
conclusions of experts, the advisors should have to explain the conclusions and any 
assumptions made by the experts in reaching their conclusions. 
In Part I of this article, we describe how the historic willingness of courts in the 
United States to consider legislative intent resulted in the substance of a transaction, not 
its form, controlling the tax treatment of the transaction.  We also describe the current 
debate about whether legislative intent should be considered or whether, instead, the 
focus should be solely on the statute’s text.  We conclude that concerns about legislative 
intent are inappropriate in light of the tax legislative process.  Part II describes the 
                                                 
18 See infra notes 242–248 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 248–262 and accompanying text. 
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manner in which the textualist approach has spawned the recent development of attorneys 
willing to structure transactions based on a form that complies with the statute but likely 
conflicts with legislative intent.  It also describes the role of an opinion of counsel in 
structuring tax shelters and the methods by which counsel exploit the uncertainty in 
statutory interpretation in rendering their opinions.  Part III then analyzes the response by 
the IRS to this practice by adopting the partnership anti-abuse regulations and concludes 
that the regulations are valid.  Part IV analyzes the wisdom of the regulations and 
recommends proposals for consideration by Treasury that will insure that tax advisors 
apply the anti-abuse regulations to tax shelters in their opinion letters. 
 
I.  The Role of Legislative Intent and Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes. 
 
Scholars have identified four methods of statutory interpretation that have been 
employed by the courts: intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, and the practical reason 
(or dynamic) method.  The first three of these methods have been termed 
“foundational”20 because each identifies the primary source for interpreting a statute.  In 
this Part, we describe the four types of statutory interpretation.  We explain that courts 
have traditionally used the the intentionalist and purposivist methods of interpretation in 
the United States.  We conclude that textualism is inappropriate for interpreting statutes 
in general, and is particularly inappropriate for interpreting tax statutes.    
In vogue through the 1920’s, intentionalism seeks to determine what the 
legislature intended the statute to mean by examining committee reports and floor 
statements by sponsors.  This method of interpretation reflects a view that in interpreting 
                                                 
20 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 321, 321 (1990). 
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a statute, a court acts as the agent of Congress.21  Under this view, it is appropriate to 
consult legislative history, even where the statutory language is clear, to insure that the 
interpretation does not conflict with the legislature’s intent.22   
The purposivist, in contrast, does not inquire what the legislature intended the 
statute to mean, but rather asks what the statute’s purpose was as the time of enactment in 
order to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with that purpose.23 The intentionalist 
and purposivist methods are quite similar.  Indeed, purposivism has been described as the 
fall back from the concept of legislative intent.  The major theoretical difference between 
the two is that while the intentionalists try to determine what the legislature’s intent 
actually was at the time of enactment, the purposivists try to determine what the statute 
would have meant at the time of enactment when read by a reasonably intelligent 
informed reader.  To identify this purpose, the purposivist will also examine legislative 
history. 
The textualist, in contrast, eschews all legislative history because she considers it 
highly suspect.24  She looks instead to the statute’s language and other sources to identify 
the text’s meaning.  Justice Scalia has stated that the textualist should seek “an objectified 
intent—that a person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the 
remainder of the corpus juris.”25  He elaborated: 
The meaning of terms in the statute books ought to be determined, 
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been 
understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress, but 
rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with 
                                                 
21 Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle On Text, Context, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 577, 587 n.30 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 627 
(1990). 
22 Cavanaugh, supra note 21, at 587 n.30; Eskridge, supra note 21, at 626. 
23 HART & SACKS, supra note 2, 1374–1376. 
24 Scalia, supra note 1, at 29–37. 
25 Id. at 17. 
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context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been 
understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the 
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most 
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the 
provision must be integrated—a compatibility, which by a benign 
fiction, we assume that Congress always had in mind.26 
 
 Under the textualist method, an interpreter is not limited to examining the text of 
the statute, itself, and related statutes, but may also consult various textual authorities 
existing at the time of enactment (e.g., dictionaries, case law, possibly treatises).27  In 
addition, the interpreter should apply “statutory clear statement rules” (i.e., strong canons 
of statutory interpretation setting forth policy presumption that may only be overcome by 
statutory text clearly to the contrary).  As mentioned above, the one text not consulted is 
legislative history, except to determine the background context of the legislation where 
such background may be independently verified.28 
The fourth method of statutory interpretation is the practical reasoning or dynamic 
interpretation.  This method, which was developed by Eskridge & Frickey, holds that all 
three foundational methods are not only flawed, but also do not reflect what the courts 
actually do.  The practical reasoning method does not reject the foundational methods per 
se, but rather “refuses to privilege intention, purpose or text as the sole touchstone for 
interpretation.”29 An interpreter under this model looks “at a broad range of evidence—
text, historical evidence, and the text’s evolution—and thus form[s] a preliminary view of 
the statute.”30  The interpreter then develops that “preliminary” view by testing various 
                                                 
26 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment). 
27 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 42 (1994). 
28 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 731–34 (1997) 
(observing that Justice Scalia had referred to a Senate Report to determine circumstances surrounding  the 
enactment of a statute in United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 448 (1988), where such circumstances 
could be independently verified). 
29 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 322. 
30 Id. at 352. 
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possible interpretations against the multiple criteria of fidelity to the text, historical 
accuracy, and conformity to circumstances and values.31  Each criterion is relevant, yet 
none necessarily trumps the others.32  What is most important for present purposes is the 
last aspect of this analysis, the “conformity to contemporary circumstances and values.”33 
In his book on dynamic interpretation, Professor Eskridge (quoting Arthur Phelps) states 
“the interpreter asks ‘not only what the statute means abstractly, or even on the basis of 
legislative history, but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our 
present day society.’”34  He further states, “Sometimes the circumstances will be 
materially different from those contemplated by the statutory drafters, and in that event 
any application of the statute will be dynamic in the strong sense, going against the 
drafter’s expectations, which have been negated because important assumptions have 
been undone.”35 
No matter what method of statutory interpretation is employed, the starting point 
is always the same:  the text.  Nevertheless, for over 100 years the courts have been 
willing to look at the legislative history of a statute to clarify ambiguities, and to avoid 
applying the law in ways that produce unintended results.36  Frequently, the courts will 
use legislative history to limit the scope of a statute’s application in situations which 
literally fall within the statute’s language.  This practice can be traced back to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.37  In this case, 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 359–60. 
34 ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 50. 
35 Id. 
36 Cavanaugh, supra note 21, at 587 n.30; Eskridge, Jr., supra note 21, at 627. 
37 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892).  For a thorough discussion of this case, see Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the 
Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter and History in Legislative Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 
(2000). 
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the Court was called upon to interpret a statute that forbade anyone “. . . to prepay the 
transportation . . . of . . . any foreigner into the United States . . . under contract or 
agreement . . . to perform labor or services of any kind in the United States. . . .”38  The 
defendant, an Episcopal Church located in New York City, hired an English minister 
living in England to be its new pastor.  The church paid the new pastor’s transportation to 
the United States.  As the Court noted, if one were to look solely at the text of the statute, 
the defendant clearly violated the law.  The Court, however, using the intentionalist 
approach, looked beyond the text and found that the “title of the Act, the evil which was 
intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the 
reports of the committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress 
was simply to stay the influx of . . . cheap unskilled labor . . .”,39 not of ministers.  The 
Court further observed that it is the “duty of courts . . . to say that however broad the 
language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the 
intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.”40 
Since its decision in Holy Trinity, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that 
there are “rare and exceptional circumstances” under which the courts must depart from 
the letter of the law.  Although exactly what those circumstances must be is not entirely 
clear.41  Until recently the Court has invariably used the statute’s legislative history to 
make that determination. 
                                                 
38 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472. 
39 Id. at 458. 
40 Id. at 472. 
41 For example, in Crooks v. Harrelson, the Court stated: 
[T]o justify a departure from the letter of the law . . . the absurdity must be so gross as 
to shock the general moral or common sense . . . .  And there must be something to 
make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail. 
282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). 
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Legislative history has played an important role in the development of the tax law.  
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court’s usual practice in analyzing a tax 
provision has been to start with the statute’s words and then place those words in the 
context of the Code and the provision’s legislative history.42  The Court has stated that 
“the words of statutes – including revenue acts – should be interpreted when possible in 
their ordinary, everyday senses.”43  But it has tempered this statement by observing: 
We have noted that “[t]he true meaning of a single section of a statute in a 
setting as complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its 
language, cannot be ascertained if it be considered apart from related 
                                                                                                                                                 
        Shortly after Harrelson, however, the Court retreated from the requirement that the “absurdity . . . be 
so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense . . ..”  In United States v. American Trucking 
Association, the Court limited the scope of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate 
the hours of employees only to employees who affect the safety of operation.  310 U.S. 534, 553 (1940).  
The Court stated: 
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the 
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.  Often these 
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation.  In 
such cases we have followed their plain meaning.  When that meaning has led to absurd 
or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the 
act.  Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results 
but merely an unreasonable one “plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as 
a whole” this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. 
Id. at 543–44 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)). 
          The Court has not resolved the tension between Harrelson and American Trucking.  The Court has 
often cited Harrelson and quoted the “rare and exceptional circumstances” language without also quoting 
the phrase that the “absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.”  See 
Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 
623, 633 n.76 (1986) (listing cases through 1984).  Since 1984, the Court has only once referred to the 
requirement that a literal interpretation produce a “gross” absurdity.  In Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, 
Inc., a case involving the Coal Act, the Court quoted the lower court’s statement that the lower court could 
not ignore unambiguous language because the language did not produce a result “so gross as to shock the 
general moral or common sense” in summarizing the lower court’s prior action on the case. 534 U.S. 438, 
450 (2002)  The Court did not quote the language in its own analysis of the statute.  In all other cases since 
1984, the Court has quoted only the “rare and exceptional circumstance” language.  See Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1997); King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 222 n.14 (1991); 
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991); Int’l 
Primate Prot. League v. Admr’s of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1991); Demarest v. James, 498 
U.S. 184, 190 (1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990); Pub. Citizen v. United States, 
491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United 
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). 
42 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 737–44 (1989); Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 
U.S. 212, 215–22 (1988); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 304–17 (1983); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. 
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 391–95 (1983). 
43 Malat v. Riddell, 323 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947)). 
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sections, or if the mind be isolated from the history of the income tax 
legislation of which it is an integral part.”44 
 
The Court has used legislative history to limit the literal language of tax 
provisions.  For example, in United States v. Correll, at issue was the Internal Revenue 
Service’s interpretation of the statutory rule under § 162(a)(2) that permits a deduction 
for the cost of meals incurred while “traveling . . . away from home in the pursuit of a 
trade or business.” 45  Literally read, one might argue that a commuter should be able to 
deduct all of her meals while she is at work.  Only those who work at home would not be 
entitled to deduct their meals.  The legislative history of this provision makes it clear that 
this is not what was intended.46  The provision was meant to apply to those traveling 
expenses incurred in excess of those ordinarily required.47  To implement this rule, the 
Service established the so-called overnight rule, i.e., to be entitled to a deduction under 
this provision, the business trip must require the taxpayer to stop for sleep or rest.  It is 
hard to justify the overnight rule simply by looking at the text of the statute; the statute 
appears to be written in terms of geography, not time.  Nevertheless, with extensive use 
of its legislative history, the Supreme Court held the overnight rule to be valid. 
Legislative history has also played a very important role in the development of 
various judicial doctrines.  In the seminal case of Gregory v. Helvering,48 the taxpayer, 
Mrs. Gregory, wished to dispose of stock held by her wholly-owned corporation in the 
most tax-efficient way.  To accomplish this, she created a new corporation, which would 
allow her to exploit favorable tax provisions by structuring the sale as part of a corporate 
                                                 
44 Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 223 (1984) (quoting Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 
126 (1934)). 
45 389 U.S. 299, 300 (1967). 
46 Id.  at 305 n.20 (quoting, S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 9 (1954)). 
47 Id. 
48 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev’d, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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reorganization.  The corporate reorganization served no purpose other than to reduce her 
tax liability and, after the reorganization, the new corporation was dissolved. 
The IRS challenged the applicability of the reorganization provisions to the 
transaction.  At the trial court, the IRS asserted that the favorable tax provisions for 
reorganizations should not apply because the new corporation was transitory.49  The trial 
court rejected this argument because the structure of the transaction satisfied the literal 
requirements for a reorganization.  The court observed that a “statute so meticulously 
drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy . . ..”50  The Court 
of Appeals reversed.51  It determined that Congress intended the favorable reorganization 
provisions to apply only to real business transactions because both the House and Senate 
Reports stated that their purpose was to favor “exchanges made in connection with a 
reorganization in order that ordinary business transactions will not be prevented.”52  As a 
result, the Court of Appeals determined that the provision should not apply to a 
transaction that was not part of the conduct of business, but rather part of a plan to reduce 
an individual’s tax liability.  The court was very careful to note that it was not saying that 
the steps taken by the taxpayer and her corporations had failed to occur.  Rather, it 
emphasized that it was concluding that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to 
non-business transactions such as that devised by the taxpayer.  The court stated: 
We do not indeed agree fully with the way in which the Commissioner 
treated the transaction; we cannot treat as inoperative the … [actions of 
taxpayer].  The [new] Corporation had a juristic personality, whatever the 
purpose of its organization….  All these steps were real, and their only 
defect was that they were not what the statute means by a 
“reorganization,” because the transactions were not part of the conduct of 
                                                 
49 27 B.T.A. at 225. 
50 Id. at 225. 
51 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). 
52 Id. at 811. 
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the business of either or both companies; so viewed were a sham, though 
all the proceedings had their usual effect.53 
 
In a very short opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, finding that 
the transaction served “no business or corporate purpose.”54  Although the Supreme 
Court did not explicitly refer to any legislative history, it clearly affirmed the Court of 
Appeals decision.  The Court stated:  “. . .[T]he question for determination is whether 
what was done . . . was the thing which the statute intended.  The reasoning of the court 
below in . . . a negative answer leaves little to be said.”55 
 With the advent of the textualist movement, the Supreme Court in recent years 
has become more circumscribed in its initial determination of whether the language is 
unambiguous.  Rather than look to legislative history as a guide to confirm its view about 
the meaning of the statute, the Court in several non-tax cases has sometimes relied solely 
on the language.56  For example, Professor Merrill has observed that while the Court 
referred to legislative history in three quarters of the cases involving statutory 
interpretation during the 1988 term, during the 1992 term the Court only referred to 
legislative history in 26 out of 66 such cases.57  
 In general, we find application of the textualist approach  highly problematic.  We 
believe that ignoring the legislative history surrounding the enactment of a particular 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–21 (2001); Michael Koby, The Supreme 
Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 369, 384–91 (1999) (summarizing statistics that show declining reliance on legislative history); 
Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard A Voice Crying In The 
Wilderness? 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 57 (documenting decreased use of legislative history by Supreme 
Court in 1992-1993 Term); Thomas Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 351, 351 (1994) (finding significant increase in use of textualism by the Supreme Court during the 
period 1981-1992). 
57 Merrill, supra note 56, at 356. 
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provision can only make the task of interpreting that provision more difficult and the 
ultimate interpretation more arbitrary.  Ambiguity is often not obvious; one normally 
needs a frame of reference.  Usually, there must be something else present to serve as a 
basis for comparison before the existence of ambiguity can be ascertained.  For example, 
reconsider the Correll case, discussed above, interpreting the provision that permits a 
deduction for the cost of one’s meals while traveling “away from home in pursuit of a 
trade or business.”  On the first reading this phrase does not appear to be ambiguous.  
However, when applied in various factual contexts, its ambiguity becomes apparent.  For 
example, should all meals consumed during working hours be deductible except for those 
eaten at home? 
 When the Supreme Court has applied the textualist approach, it refers to canons of 
construction,58 the dictionary,59 the relationship of the provision to the statute as a 
whole,60 to other legislative enactments, 61  and case law existing at the time the statute 
was adopted.62  Two of these sources are rarely helpful.  Canons of construction are not 
helpful because they are often contradictory.  Half a century ago, Professor Llewellyn 
observed that for every canon of statutory construction used by the courts there is a 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000); Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 
(1990); Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 465, 466; Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of R.R. Passengers, 
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); see also Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal 
Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 778 (1997) (describing Court’s use of canons of construction). 
59 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 
229 (1993); Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); Heen, supra note 58, at 
778. 
60 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 
469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 
158 (1990); Heen, supra note 58, at 778. 
61 See, e.g., J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001); Green v. Bock 
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511, 513 (1989); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988); Heen 
supra note 58, at 778. 
62 See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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contradictory canon that has also been used.63  Similarly, the dictionary usually does not 
provide one definition for a word, but several alternative definitions.64  Reference to the 
statute as a whole and to other statutory enactments may also not be helpful in many 
situations because the ambiguity may only be apparent in a particular application by 
reference to legislative history.65  It is hard to see, for example, how any of the 
textualist’s tools would have been of much use in Correll.  The word “home” has 16 
definitions in Webster’s New International Directory.  The canons of statutory 
interpretation fail to provide guidance about which should be used. 
The difficulties in applying textualism to tax statutes is well-illustrated by the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Gitlitz v. Commissioner66 where the Court failed to 
consider what most tax lawyers thought was a critical ambiguity in the statute.67  The 
                                                 
63 Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How 
Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
64 Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:  Dictionary Shopping In the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 
317–18 (1998). 
65 Heen, supra note 58, at 776 (“An acontextual determination by the Court of the threshold question of 
whether a statute is ambiguous presents the possibility that a complex statute may be misinterpreted by the 
Court.”). 
66 531 U.S. 206 (2001). 
67 Critics of the use of legislative history have sought to diminish its contribution to statutory interpretation 
by arguing that Congress does not approve legislative history in adopting a statute and legislative history is 
not signed by the President. See, e.g., Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 
(1951); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, 137–97 (1975); Kenneth 
W. Starr, Observations About The Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375–79 (1987).   While 
this is true, it is also true that Article III judges are not elected officials and are not empowered by the 
Constitution to adopt legislation.  The issue is, in an imperfect world, which is the better choice?  Is it 
preferable to look to committee reports considered by those constitutionally charged with drafting 
legislation to determine what the legislation means or is it better to ignore such reports and instead allow 
the judiciary to use their copies of Webster’s Dictionary and their own unique life experiences to tell us 
what the legislation means? See generally, Aprill, supra note 64 (arguing that use of dictionaries provides 
significant discretion to judiciaries); Muriel Morrisey Spense, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power 
Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 593 (1994) (asserting that textualism pits the judiciary against the 
legislature); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 411 
(1989) (arguing that textualism is judicial activism).   
 In our view, resorting to legislative history is preferable.  See Chomsky, supra note 37, 951–52.  
Resorting to legislative history limits judicial activism and preserves majority rule in situations not 
involving constitutional rights.  See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation 
of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 836 (1991) (observing that “. . . the exclusion of 
legislative history is more likely to increase the flexibility of statutes than to render them static or rigid”).  
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issue before the Court was to determine how the rules of § 108 operate in the context of S 
corporations.  Under § 108(a),68 a taxpayer generally is permitted to exclude from gross 
income the amount of any debt discharged when the taxpayer is insolvent.69  The amount 
excluded under § 108(a) is deferred for later taxation under § 108(b) by reducing certain 
of the taxpayer’s tax attributes.  Under §§ 1366(a)(1) and 1367, the shareholders of an S 
corporation are permitted to increase the basis in their stock by their pro rata share of the 
S corporation’s items of income (including tax exempt income) for the year.70  The issue 
in Gitlitz was whether income of an insolvent S Corporation, which was excluded under  
§ 108(a), should increase the basis of the S corporation’s solvent stockholders.71  The 
resolution of that issue depended on how one interprets a special rule for S corporations 
found in § 108(d)(7)(A):  “In the case of an S corporation, subsections (a), (b), (c), and 
(g) shall be applied at the corporate level . . . .”72  Should this provision be read as 
mandating that the impact of the excluded income be confined to the corporate level, or 
should it be read as permitting the excluded income to increase the basis of the 
stockholders in their stock?   
                                                                                                                                                 
Dictionaries and perceptions of common usage are unbounded.  An examination of Webster’s Dictionary, 
which often provides more than one meaning to a word because meaning is contextual, allows a judge to 
substitute her or his judgment for the legislature’s judgment. But see, Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form 
and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 881 (1982) (arguing that resorting to legislative purpose 
by courts provides courts an opportunity for “creative” jurisprudence).  In contrast, a statement in a 
legislative committee report is bounded; it applies specifically to the statute under consideration. 
68 I.R.C. 108(a) (Thompson 2004) provides that “Gross income does not include . . . income by reason of 
the discharge of indebtedness . . . if . . . the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent.” 
69 Under I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (Thompson 2004), the amount excluded is limited to  the amount by which the 
taxpayer is insolvent. 
70 I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1) (Thompson 2004). 
71 Under I.R.C. § 1366 (Thompson 2004), income of an S corporation flows out to its stockholders.  Such 
income increases the stockholders’ basis under § 1367 (Thompson 2004). 
72 I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A) (Thompson 2004). 
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Writing for the majority, and without the aid of legislative history, Justice Thomas 
determined that the “plain text”73 of the statute required the latter interpretation.  He 
argued that sections 1366(a)(1) and 1367 clearly permit an increase in basis for each 
shareholder’s pro rata portion of tax exempt income.  The amount excluded under § 108(a) 
is tax exempt and there is nothing stated or implied in § 108(d)(7)(A) that suspends this 
rule.74  Thomas acknowledged that his interpretation results in a “double windfall” for the 
stockholders: they would not have to pay a tax on the income from cancellation of debt, 
but could use the income to increase their basis.  He also acknowledged that he knew of 
no other instance where § 108 directly benefits a solvent entity.75  Nevertheless, even with 
these misgivings, he felt constrained by the statute.   
Writing in dissent, and with the aid of legislative history, Justice Breyer argued 
that the language of § 108(d)(7)(A) was not nearly as unambiguous as the majority had 
held.  A House Committee Report, which accompanied an amendment to § 108 after  
§ 108(d)(7)(A) was enacted, stated that “[t]he exclusion and basis reduction are both 
made at the S corporation level (§ 108(d)(7)). The shareholders’ basis in their stock is not 
adjusted by the amount of debt discharge income that is excluded at the corporate 
level.”76  Although this statement was made after the enactment of § 108(d)(7)(A), it 
suggests that Congress did not intend for the shareholders to increase their basis.  With 
this in mind, Breyer asserted that if one were to read the text of § 108(d)(7)(A) 
“…literally as exclusive, both the COD exclusion (§ 108(a)) and the tax attribute 
reduction (§ 108(b)) would apply only ‘at the corporate level.’  Hence the COD income 
                                                 
73 Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 219. 
74 Id. at 214 n.6. 
75 Id. at 220 n.10. 
76 Id. at 221 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 624–25 (1993)). 
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would not flow through to S corporation shareholders.”77  He suggested that not only was 
this interpretation plausible, but it was also the “best reading of § 108 as a whole.”78   
Gitlitz is an excellent example of how the majority’s failure to consult legislative 
history caused the Court to miss an important ambiguity in the statute.  The majority’s 
analysis would have been more complete had the majority consulted the legislative 
history.  In our view,  Justice Breyer poignantly summarized what’s at stake with the shift 
towards textualism when he stated in another case: 
Language, dictionaries, and canons, unilluminated by purpose, can lead 
courts into blind alleys, producing rigid interpretations that can harm those 
whom the statute affects.  If generalized, the approach, bit by bit, will 
divorce law from the needs, lives, and values of those whom it is meant to 
serve. . . .79 
 
 Even if one is still skeptical about the usefulness of legislative history in 
interpreting statutes in general, there is an additional compelling reason for why 
legislative history is particularly relevant to understanding tax statutes.  As Professor 
Livingston has observed, the very process by which tax legislation is formulated belies 
the notion that the meaning of the statute can be based solely on its text.  Members of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee “rarely consider 
statutory language when discussing a tax bill.”80  Professor Livingston states: 
Instead the staff presents members with a list of proposals in summary, 
“conceptual” form, frequently accompanied by the estimated revenue 
effect of each proposal.  The proposals may be based on the 
Administration’s recommendations  . . . , [or] on the preferences of the 
chairman and other committee members . . . .  The committee members 
make decisions based on these summaries, only later does the staff reduce 
                                                 
77 Id. at 221. 
78 Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 224. 
79 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 192 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
80 Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of 
Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 833 (1991); see Bernard Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T:  Respecting Legislative 
Judgments In Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1254, 1270 (2000) (stating that members of Congress 
appear to support the continued use of legislative history in interpreting statutes). 
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these decisions to statutory language.  In contrast, the members of many 
[non-tax] congressional committees consider actual statutory language 
when discussing a bill.81 
 
This approach to drafting tax legislation clearly supports consulting committee reports 
when interpreting tax provisions.  The committee reports describe the “conceptual” form 
selected by the committee members and relied upon by staff to draft the statutes.  Thus, 
the reports convey the essence of what Congress thought it was accomplishing when it 
enacted the statutes. 
II.  Textualism Legitimizes Tax Shelters 
The ascendancy of textualism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the 
promotion and sale of “abusive” tax shelters.  An “abusive” tax transaction, from the 
perspective of the Treasury, is a transaction, which is designed to technically comply 
with the letter of the law, but which produces tax savings that are inappropriate to the 
underlying purposes of the statutory scheme and inconsistent with the economic reality of 
the transaction.82  It is in the nature of abusive transactions that the statute in question is 
inadequate to address the abuse.  Thus, the courts, using the intentionalist and purposivist 
approaches, have crafted, additional doctrines that permit the reviewing agency or court 
to go beyond the literal wording of the statute in order to effectuate its purpose.  The use 
of textualism, however, challenges the legitimacy of these doctrines and supports literal 
interpretations that are the keystone of tax shelters. 
In Part II, we will first briefly describe the doctrines that the courts developed to 
combat abusive tax transactions using the purposivist and intentionalist methods of 
                                                 
81 Livingston, supra note 80, at 833. 
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995); see Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse 
Regulations: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 163 (2001) 
(defining abusive transactions). 
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interpretation.  We will then discuss the manner in which tax advisors have utilized the 
textualist approach to avoid the judicial doctrines in structuring and rendering legal 
opinions about tax shelters.  The most important of the doctrines, business purpose and 
economic substance, could not have been developed under textualism and are, therefore, 
vulnerable to attack.   
A. Judicially Crafted Doctrines 
 1. The Business Purpose Doctrine 
Using the purposivist and intentionalist methods of statutory interpretation, the 
courts  developed two broad doctrines to curb abusive transactions – the business purpose 
doctrine and substance-over-form doctrine.  The business purpose doctrine provides that 
a tax statute will not be applied to a transaction unless the transaction serves some 
business purpose, other than tax avoidance.83  Although the courts created the business 
purpose doctrine based on legislative history that accompanied the adoption of the 
corporate reorganization tax provisions,84 they readily applied the doctrine in other tax 
contexts, 85 including partnerships.86  In 1949, Judge Learned Hand explained the scope 
of the doctrine in circumstances other than reorganizations: 
                                                 
83 BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 4–46 (3d 
ed., 1999). 
84 See supra notes 48 to 55 and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., Moline Props., Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1943) (holding that a business 
purpose or business activity had to be present before the existence of a corporation separate from its 
stockholders would be respected).  See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 83, at 4–46 (discussing 
cases). 
86 The courts have applied the business purpose doctrine to tax shelters that employ partnerships in two 
ways.  One has been to disregard the existence of the partnership when it lacked a business purpose.  For 
example, in Merryman v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s disregard of the 
existence of a partnership among a corporation and its controlling stockholders where the Tax Court had 
determined that the partnership lacked business purpose and served no purpose other than to allow the 
shareholders to claim investment credits with respect to assets the partnership had purchased from the 
corporation.  See 873 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1989). See also ASA Investering P’ships v. Commissioner, 201 
F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003) where 
the court disregarded the partnership.  
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The doctrine . . . means that in construing . . . a tax statute 
which describes commercial or industrial transactions we 
are to understand them to refer to transactions entered upon 
for commercial or industrial purposes and not to include 
transactions entered for no other motive but to escape 
taxation.87 
 
 Where the tax benefit claimed does not relate to a commercial transaction, the 
business purpose doctrine cannot easily be applied.  Consequently, the courts have 
modified application of the doctrine in these settings.  In Goldstein v. Commissioner,88 
the court reshaped the business purpose doctrine to apply to non-business transactions by 
requiring the taxpayer to engage in an activity for a purpose other than to save taxes.89  
The taxpayer in Goldstein had borrowed funds to invest in Treasury notes that paid less 
interest than the interest expense she incurred on the borrowing.  She prepaid the interest 
and claimed a large tax deduction in the year of prepayment.  The court denied the 
deduction, stating: 
Section 163 (a) should be construed to permit the 
deductibility of interest when a taxpayer has borrowed 
funds and incurred an obligation to pay interest in order to 
engage in what with reason can be termed purposive 
activity, even though he decided to borrow in order to gain 
an interest deduction rather than to finance the activity in 
some other way.  . . . On the other hand, and 
notwithstanding Section 163 (a)’s broad scope, this 
provision should not be construed to permit an interest 
deduction when it objectively appears that a taxpayer has 
borrowed funds in order to engage in a transaction that has 
no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer’s desire to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Another approach has been to disregard the transaction entered into by the partnership where the 
transaction lacked a business purpose.  In ACM v. Commissioner, for example, the court disallowed a loss 
allocated to a U.S. corporation by a partnership that arose from the partnership’s exploitation of an 
“anomaly” in the installment sales rules.  157 F.3d 231, 252 (3d Cir. 1998).  The court denied the loss 
deduction to the U.S. corporation on the basis that no business purpose existed for entering into the 
installment sale other than the generation of the tax loss.  See id. 
87 Commissioner v. Transp. Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 
U.S. 955 (1950). 
88 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). 
89 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 83, at 4–47. 
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obtain the benefit of a tax deduction; and a good example 
of such purposeless activity is the borrowing of funds, at 
4% in order to purchase property that returns less than 2% 
and holds out no prospect of appreciation sufficient to 
counter the unfavorable interest rate differential.90 
 
The courts have also applied the Goldstein variation of the business purpose doctrine to 
partnerships.91 
It is likely that these doctrines would never have been developed by textualists.  
No statutory language authorized the business purpose doctrine or its subsequent 
expansion in Goldstein.  Rather, the doctrines resulted from the application of the 
intentionalist and purposivist methods of statutory interpretation by the Court of Appeals  
in Gregory v. Helvering.92  
 2. The Substance-Over-Form Doctrine 
            The substance-over-form doctrine also originated in the context of corporate 
taxation.93  In contrast to the business purpose doctrine, the substance-over-form doctrine 
is rather amorphous and applies differently in different contexts and is sometimes known 
by different names.  In general, under this doctrine, courts seek to tax a transaction 
pursuant to its economic effect, rather than its form.  For example, the ‘step transaction’ 
doctrine disregards steps in a transaction that lack independent economic significance.94  
Similarly, under the ‘sham transaction’ doctrine, where a transaction involves a circular 
flow of cash or property such that each party does not change its legal or economic 
                                                 
90 Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734,741–42 (2d Cir. 1966). 
91 The Tax Court subsequently applied this approach to a similar transaction engaged in by a partnership in 
Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990).  There, the court disallowed interest deductions where the 
taxpayer’s borrowing lacked “tax-independent purpose.” The taxpayer, a partnership, purchased Treasury 
bills using borrowed proceeds. Observing that the interest expense incurred by the partnership exceeded the 
interest income from the bills, the court concluded that the transactions lacked a purposive activity. 
92 See 69 F.2d at 811. 
93 See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 332 (1945). 
94 See, e.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1991); 
True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174-77 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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position, the transaction will be disregarded.95  It is likely that a textualist would have 
developed the step-transaction and sham-transaction doctrines because they seek to 
characterize facts, not to interpret statutes. 
 This is not true, however for the most important variation of the substance-over-
form doctrine, the ‘economic substance’ doctrine.  Under this doctrine, the courts will 
deny tax benefits if the purported pre-tax economic profit is insubstantial in relation to 
the value the expected tax benefits from the transaction.  The economic substance 
doctrine is a supplement to the business purpose doctrine   The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has stated that both a business purpose and economic substance must be 
lacking before it will disregard a transaction.96  In other words, the presence of either a 
business purpose or profit motive will suffice to respect the transaction.97  Consistent 
with this suggestion, most courts apply the economic substance doctrine only after 
concluding that the transaction does not serve a non-tax business purpose other than 
generating a profit.98  One commentator explained: 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1940); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 356-
58 (1939); Rev. Rul. 78-397, 1978-2 C.B. 150. 
96 Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985) (court stated that it will 
disregard a transaction if it finds that “that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than 
obtaining tax benefits . . . and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable 
possibility of a profit exists”) (emphasis added). 
97 See Horn v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 1229, 37–38 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 
143, 148 (2d Cir. 1991).  But see, Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that it could disregard a transaction when it determined that the transaction’s sole function was 
to produce the deductions regardless of the taxpayer’s motive).  Compare IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
253 F.3d 350, 353–54 (8th Cir. 2001) (court declined to decide whether the presence of one would suffice 
because it found both present).  Other courts have concluded that the test is not intended to be a rigid two-
step analysis.  See, e.g., Casebeer v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d, 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990). 
98 John P. Warner, Statutory, Regulatory and Common Law Anti-Abuse Weapons, PLI Tax Law and Estate 
Planning Handbook Series, 52 TAX LAW AND PRACTICE, 885, 904 (Oct.-Nov. 2000); David Hariton, 
Sorting Out The Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAWYER 237, 241 (Winter 1999);  Karen N. 
Moore, The Sham Transaction Doctrine:  An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax 
Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 670 (1989).  This approach is consistent with the language the courts have 
used to explain the test.  The courts will often state that they may disregard the transaction if they “find that 
the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits…and that the 
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At least implicitly, the courts appear to apply … [the 
economic substance] test only after first finding that the 
transactions cannot serve any non-tax business purpose 
other than the generation of an economic profit.  In 
reaching such a finding, the courts apply a “strict 
scrutiny” standard to any such purported business 
purpose; i.e. the purported business must not be 
contradicted by any other information that comes to 
light about the taxpayer, the transaction must be a 
reasonably efficient means of fulfilling the purported 
business purpose in light of reasonably available 
alternatives and the transaction or arrangement as 
carried out must further such business purpose.99 
 
  In evaluating the profit motive, some courts (but not all) will compare the 
magnitude of the profit potential to the tax benefits.  Sheldon v. Commissioner100 is a 
good example of the approach.  There, the court found that no business purpose was 
present, and concluded that the possibility of only an “incidental” profit for a preplanned 
transaction could not justify the tax benefits.101   The Tax Court,102 and the Courts of 
Appeal for the Third, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have similarly employed this balancing 
test.103  Other courts, however, have not engaged in such an explicit balancing test.104 
                                                                                                                                                 
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists.”  Rice’s Toyota 
World, 752 F.2d at 91–92 (emphasis added). 
99 Warner, supra note 98, at 904. 
100 See 94 T.C. 738 (1990). 
101 See Kenneth W. Gideon, Mrs. Gregory’s Grandchildren: Judicial Restriction of Tax Shelters, 5 VA. 
TAX REV. 825, 835–39 (1986) (discussing early cases that address this issue). 
102 See, e.g., Salina P’ship LP, FPL Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. 686 (2000). 
103 ACM P’ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 257–58 (3d Cir. 1998); Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 
F.2d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 1993); Keeler v. Commissioner, 243 F.3d 1212, 1220–21 (10th Cir. 2001). 
104 See, e.g., IES Indus., Inc. v. Alliant Energy Corp., 253 F.3d 350, 351–56 (8th Cir. 2001), where the 
Eighth Circuit allowed the taxpayer to claim a capital loss and a foreign tax credit in the following 
transaction.  The taxpayer, IES, purchased foreign stock with the right to receive a dividend that would be 
subject to a 15 percent foreign withholding tax.  The purchase price for the stock was market value plus 85 
percent of the expected gross dividend.  IES sold the stock shortly thereafter for the price it had paid, less 
the dividend, since it retained the right to receive the dividend.  The subsequent receipt of the dividend by 
IES, less the 15% withholding, allowed IES to fully recover its investment.  When the dust had settled, IES 
had incurred no pre-tax economic gain or loss, but was able to claim a foreign tax credit for the amount 
withheld on the dividend and a capital loss from the stock sale.  The IRS sought to disallow the foreign tax 
credit and capital loss, arguing that the transaction was a sham since there was no economic benefit.  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that the transaction was not a sham because an economic profit existed.  The 
court reasoned that the profit was 100 percent of the gross dividend amount, less the 85 percent amount 
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The courts would not have developed the economic substance doctrine if they had 
been using the textualist method of statutory interpretation.  The economic substance 
doctrine, like the business purpose doctrine, is the result of a purposivist or intentionalist 
method of interpretation.  It imposes an additional requirement that is not explicitly 
expressed in the statutory language.  It is based on the judiciary’s view that a transaction 
must have some purpose other than tax avoidance before it may benefit from the 
provisions of the tax statute.   
B. Textualism and Purposive Activity 
Despite the potentially wide application of these doctrines, tax advisors have 
frequently diminished their significance in structuring abusive transactions.105 Textualism 
is a major contributor to the problem for two reasons. First, textualism undermines the 
legitimacy of the business purpose and economic substance doctrines, since it is likely 
that a textualist would  never have formulated the doctrines.  The textualist would not 
have consulted the legislative history that the lower court in Gregory v. Helvering 
examined  to determine that Congress intended the reorganization provisions to apply to 
                                                                                                                                                 
attributable to the dividend that the taxpayer paid on acquiring the stock.  Although IES never received the 
15 percent of the dividend that was withheld, the court treated such amount as profit because it provided a 
benefit to the taxpayer; i.e., it satisfied it’s tax liability.  The court made no attempt to balance this “profit” 
with the tax benefits the taxpayer obtained from the transaction.  See Compaq Computer Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 779–88 (5th Cir. 2001) (engaging in the same analysis for an identical 
transaction). 
105 The advisors’ willingness to do so can be attributed to a number of factors, some of which are not 
related to textualism.  First, the audit lottery heavily favors taxpayers investing in tax shelters organized as 
partnerships because there is a low audit rate for partnerships.  Many practitioners we spoke to in Boston 
and New York have never had a tax shelter partnership client audited by the IRS other than family limited 
partnerships used in estate planning.  In 2002, the IRS only audited 0.39 percent of the tax returns for flow-
through entities such as partnerships.  STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS 
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998  37 (JCX-53-03) (May 19, 2003). 
 Consequently, most abusive transactions are not even identified as such, much less litigated.  
Second, because of the complexity of the abusive transactions, it is likely that, even if audited, the 
examining IRS agents will lack the sophistication to identify the abuse.  Practitioners have frequently told 
us of the complexity of tax shelter structures where several layers of partnerships and other entities are used 
to obfuscate the transaction. 
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bona fide business transactions.  Moreover, a textualist would not have reshaped the 
business purpose requirement into a general requirement of purposive activity without 
express statutory support.   
Second, textualism limits the sources that a court may consult in interpreting a 
statute. The elimination of legislative history as a tool to determine a statute’s purpose 
makes it less likely that the court will find authority to limit application of the statute’s 
literal text.106  This is illustrated by the experience of Great Britain.  Until relatively 
recently, British courts used a form of textualism that would not consider a statute’s 
purpose unless the words used in the statute had no “determinate ordinary meaning and 
… [were] unclear on their face.”107   The result of this approach to statutory interpretation 
was that the courts accorded favorable tax treatment to a transaction that complied with 
the statute’s formal requirements even if it conflicted with the statute’s purpose. 108  Until 
British courts started look to a statute’s purpose109 and legislative history110, the form of 
the transaction, not its legislative purpose, controlled the outcome.  A similar experience 
is reported to have occurred in Canada.  Brian Arnold, a leading authority on Canadian 
                                                 
106 Senator Grassley has expressed concern about the recent approach of courts to interpreting tax statutes 
and the rise in tax shelters.  He stated, “ . . . I’m worried about the Tax Court blessing highly artful 
interpretations of the code.”  David Cay Johnston, Tax Moves By Enron Said to Mystify the I.R.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at C1. 
107 P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 101 (1987) 
(stating “ . . . the accepted doctrine in English law is that courts are not entitled to consider the statutory 
purpose unless the words used in the statues have no determinate ordinary meaning and are . . . unclear on 
their face . . . .”)  
108 See, e.g., Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1 (1935); William 
Popkin, Judicial Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrine In England: A United States Perspective, 8 BRIT. TAX  REV. 
283, 283 (1991) (observing that until the 1980’s, English courts “were reluctant to use statutory purpose to 
interpret statutes, preferring to stick closely to the text”). 
109 W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. I.R.C.,[1981] 1 All E.R. 865; McGuckian v. I.R.C., [1997] STC 918 (House of 
Lords favors purposivist approach to interpreting tax statutes). 
110 Pepper v. Hart, [1992] STC 898, 922–923 (House of Lords reversing centuries of precedent and ruling  
that courts may consult legislative history).  But see JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW 49 (4th ed. 2000) (arguing 
that in cases subsequent to Pepper v. Hart, the ability to consult legislative history has not affected the 
court’s interpretation of the statute).  
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law, has suggested that a similar literalist approach by the Canadian courts, which seeks 
the plain meaning of a statute’s language, has resulted in the courts failure to strike down 
“several blatant tax-avoidance schemes.”111  
 The challenges posed by textualism embolden tax shelter advisors to push the 
limits.  The highly respected New York State Bar Association has stated that “a taxpayer 
may have a respectable argument that the common law doctrines do not apply to . . . a 
transaction that literally complies with subchapter K.”112  Moreover, a practitioner has 
argued in a recent law review article that the assent of textualism means that economic 
substance and business purpose doctrines are invalid.113 Some lawyers believe that the 
IRS, itself, is concerned that textualism will undermine the doctrines.  For example, some 
have asserted that if an IRS agent identifies a particular transaction as abusive, the 
government is likely to settle rather than apply the business purpose and economic 
substance doctrines to transactions that literally comply with Subchapter K.114  Those 
lawyers believe that the IRS is concerned that the courts would reject application of the 
doctrines to complex statutes and that the deterrent effect of the doctrines would be 
lost.115   Even legislators have expressed concern that the Tax Court is “blessing highly 
                                                 
111 Brian J. Arnold, Reflections on the Relationship Between Statutory Interpretation and Tax Avoidance, 
49 CAN. TAX J. 1, 12–22 (2001). 
112 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 10, at 235. 
113 Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form Doctrines in Tax Law, 
43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 749–50 (2003) 
114 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 10, at 235. 
115 Id. 
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artful interpretations of the tax code”116 and bills have been proposed that would codify 
the economic substance doctrine.117  
The magnitude of the actual threat is difficult to access.  We believe that a court, 
using the textualist approach, might disregard principles that were developed based upon 
legislative intent, but that such disregard would be highly inappropriate.  Although 
textualism disregards legislative history, it should not disregard decades of established 
judicial precedent that has established the manner in which tax statutes should be 
applied.118  Justice Scalia’s statement that textualism selects a meaning that is “most 
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which provision must be integrated”119 
should take into account existing case law and stare decisis.120  Nevertheless, the concern 
ascribed to the IRS may be legitimate.  There is evidence that the staunchest advocates of 
textualism will often disregard long-established precedent where textualism leads them to 
a different conclusion.121 
In any event, textualism makes it easier for lawyers to render favorable tax shelter 
opinions that aid in selling tax shelters.122  Some attorneys assert that textualism places 
such significant weight on the language of the statute that it is not necessary that the 
activity being taxed have a non-tax avoidance purpose so long as the activity actually 
                                                 
116 David Cay Johnston, Tax Moves By Enron Said to Mystify the I.R.S.,  N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at C1 
(reporting that Senator Grassley has expressed concern about the recent approach of courts to interpreting 
tax statutes and the rise in tax shelters and quoting him as stating, “. . . I’m worried about the Tax Court 
blessing highly artful interpretations of the code.”). 
117 S. 1637 (2003) 
118 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 n.34 (1986). 
119 Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. 
120 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 827, 831 (1991). 
121 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 451–60 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for 
rejection of the Miranda doctrine); Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699, 701, 727 (2002) 
(observing that the Supreme Court has recently tended to disregard precedent). 
122 For an account of the important role of attorney opinions in selling tax shelters, see David Cay Johnston, 
Costly Opinions Arise on Legal Opinions For Tax Shelters,  N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, § 1, at 25. 
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occurred.123  In ACM, the taxpayer’s attorney argued that the allocation of the loss to the 
U.S. taxpayer should be respected because the transaction satisfied the literal 
requirements of the statutes.124  Indeed, in his dissent, Judge McKee harshly criticized the 
majority’s application of the economic substance test.  He stated: 
I can’t help but suspect that the majority’s conclusion . . . is . . . akin to a 
“smell test,” . . .  If the scheme . . . smells bad, the intent to avoid taxes 
defines the result as we do not want the taxpayer to “put one over.”125 
 
 Most advisors will not ignore entirely the judicially crafted doctrines in their 
opinions.  Even where the tax shelter’s form complies with the text of the statute, some 
opinions on tax shelters still present some argument for why the tax shelter also possesses 
a business purpose or economic substance.  The judicial trend toward textualism, 
however, encourages lawyers to diminish the importance of these doctrines.  Their 
opinions will frequently state that the determination of the presence of business purpose 
or economic substance is inherently factual and difficult to predict.  They do not compare 
the magnitude of profit potential to tax benefits.  Often, they simply assume the problem 
away.  For example, in a highly publicized tax shelter case (Long-Term Capital Holdings 
v. United States126), an opinion issued by a prominent New York law firm assumed that 
the tax shelter in question would generate a “meaningful pre-tax profit” and provided no 
analysis of the economic substance issue.127  During the trial of that tax shelter, the 
                                                 
123 See N.Y. State Bar  Ass’n, supra note 10, 235–36 (stating “the common law authority is very general in 
nature, and there is little case law involving the application of such doctrines in the partnership context.  As 
a result, a taxpayer may have a respectable argument that the common law doctrines do not apply to . . . 
transaction that literally complies with Subchapter K . . . .”); Deborah Geier, Commentary: Textualism and 
Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 453–54 (1993) (arguing that textualism prevents consideration of 
“general policy arguments” in interpreting tax statutes). 
124 157 F.3d at 245. 
125 Id. at 265. 
126 Case No. 3:01cv1290 (JBA) (D Conn.). 
127 Letter by Shearman & Sterling, dated October 4, 1994 (admitted into evidence in Long-Term Capital 
Holdings v. United States,  Case No. 3:01cv 1290 (JBA) (D. Conn. 2003) [hereinafter Shearman Letter]. 
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attorney who had drafted the opinion testified that he had failed to “check out” the 
economic assumptions upon which he had based his opinion letter.128  
 Although these opinions make short shrift of business purpose and economic 
substance, they are effective marketing tools because they clearly allow taxpayers to 
avoid the fraud penalty of § 6663.129  Early in the history of the fraud penalty, the courts 
concluded that a taxpayer has not acted fraudulently if he or she is acting upon the advice 
of an accountant or lawyer.130  Indeed, it appears that the IRS has not been asserting the 
fraud penalty in tax shelter cases.131 
Such opinions, although deficient in their analysis of business purpose and 
economic substance, may also allow a taxpayer to avoid the penalties under § 6662, or at 
least present an argument for why they should not apply.  Section 6662, in general, 
imposes a civil penalty of 20 percent for understatements of tax liability on an 
individual’s tax return that are attributable to negligence or lack of  “substantial 
authority.”132  Taxpayers who are individuals may avoid the penalties if they have a 
“reasonable cause” for their position and they acted in good faith.133  Regulations define 
what constitutes “reasonable cause” where the taxpayer relies on the opinion of an 
advisor.134  The regulations require that the advice be based on “all pertinent facts and 
                                                 
128 See David Cay Johnston, Partner Testifies That Tax Shelter of Hedge Fund Was Legitimate,  N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2003, at C1, Col. 5 (Late Ed.).  (Reporting testimony of tax attorney that he had failed to 
“check out” the economic assumptions upon which he had based his opinion letter for a tax shelter). 
129 Section 6663 imposes a civil penalty equal to 75 percent of the portion of a tax underpayment that is 
attributable to fraud. I.R.C. § 6663 (Thompson 2004). 
130 See, e.g., Jamison v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1930); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 
1398 (1970), aff’d, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1974). 
131 See Mark Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence:  Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 260 n.26 
(2002). 
132 I.R.C. § 6662(a) and (d)(2)(B) (Thompson 2004). 
133 I.R.C. § 6664 (Thompson 2004). 
134 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
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circumstances and the law as it relates to those facts and circumstances.”135  The 
regulations also require that the advice not be based on “unreasonable factual or legal 
assumptions.”136  It is possible that the IRS could argue that the attorneys’ assumptions 
about business purpose and economic substance are unreasonable, but the IRS has 
reportedly not done so.137  An inquiry into “unreasonableness” would likely require a 
detailed inquiry into the applicability of the doctrines themselves.  Indeed, the New York 
State Bar Association has stated: 
. . .[T]axpayers know that penalties are unlikely because of their literal 
compliance with the statute and regulations, and as a result believe (often 
with considerable justification) that even with an unfavorable settlement 
they will generally end up better off than if they had not engaged in the 
abusive transaction.138 
 
            Corporate taxpayers have a greater burden to bear in order to avoid the § 6662 
penalties.  In the case of tax shelters,139 corporate taxpayers must have “reasonably 
believed that the tax treatment . . . was more likely than not the proper treatment” and 
must also have “substantial authority” for their position.140  Textualism helps corporate 
taxpayers construct an argument that these requirements are satisfied.  Taxpayers use 
opinions of counsel, which were discussed above,141 to support their assertion that they 
reasonably believed that the shelter’s treatment of a tax item was more likely than not 
correct.  Moreover, the regulations state that a “. . . taxpayer may have substantial 
                                                 
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003). 
136 Id. 
137 See Lee Sheppard, Tax Shelter Opponents Turn Practical, 22 INS. TAX REV. 989, 991 (June 2002). 
138 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 10, at 235–36. 
139 The term “tax shelter” is defined as: 
 (I) a partnership or other entity, 
 (II) any investment plan or arrangement, or 
 (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or 
arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax.” 
140 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i) (Thompson 2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(e)(2)(A) and (B) (as amended 
2003). 
141 See supra notes 122–137 and accompanying text. 
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authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of the 
applicable statutory provision.”142  Some practitioners argue that this language suggests 
that the text of the statute can constitute substantial authority, even though it might be 
applied in a transaction that lacks business purpose or economic substance.  We find this 
argument to be extremely weak because it ignores the additional requirement in the 
regulations that contrary authorities must be considered.143  It is quite likely, for example, 
that the text of tax statutes relating to business activities would not constitute substantial 
authority where the transaction to which the statute is applied lacks a business purpose.144  
Nevertheless, the availability of the argument emboldens taxpayers to play the audit 
lottery. 
 
III.  The Anti-Abuse Regulations 
A. The Advantage of Anti-Abuse Regulations 
 The ascendancy of textualism and the proliferation of tax shelters have created an 
enormous problem for Treasury.  Historically, Treasury had responded to abusive 
transactions in two ways, one involving rules and the other standards.  If the Service 
identified a particular abusive transaction, it would adopt a rule, or request Congress to 
adopt a rule, that specifically targeted that transaction.145  Treasury would also attack 
abusive transactions that it discovered on audit by litigation, asking the courts to apply 
their judicially created doctrines or standards to deny the sought-after tax benefits.   
                                                 
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2003). 
143 The regulations state that there is “substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item only if the 
weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities 
supporting contrary treatment….”  Treas. Reg. 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 2003). 
144 See generally Nicole Rose Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 328 (2001) (imposing § 6662 penalty and 
stating that the “participation of highly paid professionals provides petitioner no protection, excuse, 
justification or immunity . . .”). 
145 For example, in response to transactions that used partnerships to disguise sales and shift gains, 
Congress enacted I.R.C. §§ 707 (a)(2)(B), 704 (c)(1)(B), 737 (Thompson 2004). 
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Neither strategy proved sufficiently effective for the current wave of tax shelters.  
Treasury seemed reluctant to pursue litigation and to request the courts to apply the 
judicial doctrines.  One explanation for this may be a fear that, with the advent of 
textualism, the courts will not apply or extend these doctrines to novel transactions, 
especially if the transactions involve the detailed partnership statutes.146  Another 
explanation may be concerns about political fallout from vigorously pursuing tax shelter 
cases.147 
 Adopting rules designed to close down specific transactions also did not work 
very well because, in most cases, Treasury had no clue as to how these transactions were 
being structured.  In contrast with the tax shelters of the 1970’s and early 1980’s that 
were syndicated, widely marketed and well known, many of the abusive transactions that 
Treasury was most concerned with were being individually tailored, and sold to, 
particular taxpayers.  A promoter of these deals often required prospective clients to 
swear to secrecy (by signing a confidentiality agreement) before the deal was explained 
to prevent competitors and the government from getting wind of it.148  Unless a Good 
Samaritan informed Treasury about a particular deal, the only way it would be discovered 
was on audit.  However, audits were ineffective because only a small percentage of 
                                                 
146 See supra notes 112–121 and accompanying text. 
147 See Schler, supra note 5, at 346 (suggesting that the failure to collect data about the loss of revenues 
from tax shelters is politically motivated); David Cay Johnston, A Tax Break for the Rich Who Can Keep A 
Secret,  N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at C1 (Late Ed.) (reporting statement of Mark Weinberger, former 
Treasury official under President Bush, that the Treasury was not attacking a particular tax shelter that 
allowed taxpayers to avoid capital gains because “we are against taxes on capital gains in general . . . ”).  
148 Tax shelter promoters no longer require that taxpayers sign confidentiality agreements because such 
agreements will trigger an obligation to register the shelter with the IRS.  See I.R.C. § 6111(d) and (a) 
(Thompson 2004).  However, the investors in tax shelters are usually highly sophisticated and unlikely to 
discuss the shelter in public. 
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returns are reviewed and the abusive transactions are buried in piles of paperwork.149  
Finally, if a particular transaction was identified and addressed by a new rule, the rule 
would only apply prospectively.  This has been especially true for legislative 
responses.150  In addition, once the new rule became effective, promoters could easily 
concoct new abusive transactions that literally complied with the rule.   
 Treasury determined that it needed a new strategy, one that reasserted the validity 
of the judicial doctrines as well as one that recognized that Treasury could not keep pace 
with the tax shelter industry.  By promulgating the partnership anti-abuse regulations, 
Treasury chose to impose an overarching standard on the specific rules of Subchapter K.  
In doing so, it sought to put all parties on notice that the standards that had originated in 
the courts applied with full force to transactions involving partnerships.  In addition, 
Treasury sought to require that the purposivist method of statutory interpretation be used 
to interpret Subchapter K.  
Treasury’s approach was both novel and aggressive.  Treasury had never  
been this assertive before, especially in the absence of a specific legislative mandate.   
The tax bar was taken completely off guard.  Its reaction was immediate and  
vociferous, denouncing the regulations as administrative overreaching.151  A few  
former government officials called for their immediate withdrawal and several  
                                                 
149 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 116, at C1 (stating that the “I.R.S. has stepped up efforts to find tax 
shelters, but the agency lacks the resources to address the problem fully . . .”); Novack & Saunders, supra 
note 3, at 202 (stating that the “IRS is not equipped to find most shelters”). 
150 See, e.g., the legislative responses listed supra note 145. 
151  See, e.g., William S. McKee & Mark A. Kuller, Issues Relating to Choice of Entity, “Entity 
Characterization and Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules,” in TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN 
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES  (PLI, June 2000); William S. 
McKee, William F. Nelson, Robert L. Whitmire, Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule: Final Regulation, in TAX 
PLANNING FOR CORPORATE JOINT VENTURES, PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1995 
(PLI, July 1995);  James A. Gouwar, The Proposed Anti-Abuse Regulation:  Treasury Oversteps Its 
Authority, 11 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX’N 287 (1995); Letter from the Tax Section of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association, (June 30, 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT 140-31;  Letter from Charles Levin, Chair of the Federal 
Taxation Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, (June 30, 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT139-61. 
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bar associations issued reports declaring the new rules invalid.152  Even those few  
who lent support to the rules did so in a qualified manner.153  The pressure became  
so great that Treasury issued a statement that that the anti-abuse rules would not  
be asserted without the approval of the National Office.   
When all the dust settled, the anti-abuse regulations have not been an effective  
tool against abusive tax shelters for at least two reasons.  First, many members of  
the bar remain skeptical of their validity.   Second, Treasury  continues to require a field 
agent to receive approval from the National Office before asserting the regulations.154  
This policy may have the perverse effect of making it more difficult for an agent to assert 
judicial doctrine after the promulgation of the regulations than before. 
We regret the reactions of both the bar and Treasury to the anti-abuse  
regulations.  As we demonstrate below, Treasury acted well within its  
authority when it promulgated these regulations and, if taken seriously, they  
could provide several potential benefits   The regulations would require attorneys to 
analyze the judicial doctrines in opining on reverse-engineered transactions rather than 
relying solely on the statutory language.155  This analysis would put potential investors on 
notice that the tax shelter’s tax benefit is suspect.  Furthermore, reassertion of the 
applicability of the doctrines would relieve some of the strain on the IRS, if tax advisors 
consider the doctrines in advising clients on tax shelters.  The IRS would be able to 
reduce the number of, and complexity in, its regulations and notices, since it would not be 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., Letter from Donald C. Alexander, et al to the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, (Aug. 18, 
1995), reprinted in 95 TNT 125–28; Letter from the Tax Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association, (June 
30, 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT 140-31;  Letter from Charles Levin, Chair of the Federal Taxation 
Committee of the Chicago Bar  Ass’n, (June 30 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT 139-61. 
153 See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 10. 
154 Ann. 94-87, 1994-27 I.R.B. 124 (1994). 
155 To deal with lawyers who may not be so careful, we recommend in Part IV that the standards of practice 
be amended to require lawyers to analyze the applicability of the doctrines to the specific facts of the tax 
shelter in their opinion letters.  We also recommend that if the lawyer’s opinion relies on experts as to the 
profit potential of the tax shelter, the lawyer’s opinion should explain the manner in which the expert 
formulated her conclusion about the shelter’s profit potential and the assumptions upon which she relied. 
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necessary to address every potentially abusive situation in which a tax provision might be 
applied.156   
We believe that Treasury should rescind its order that requires National Office 
approval before the regulations be asserted, and do so in a very public way.  Treasury 
should state clearly that it believes the promulgation of these regulations was well within 
its administrative authority and grounded in sound tax policy.  By doing so, the tax bar 
would have to take these regulations seriously.  It is undoubtedly true that many members 
of the bar will continue to believe these regulations will ultimately be found invalid.  
Nevertheless they will also be on notice that Treasury is more than willing to litigate the 
issue.  In sum, the regulations will once again have teeth and will be able to serve the 
prophylactic role for which they were designed.  
 
B. Brief Summary of the Anti-Abuse Regulations 
To understand the partnership anti-abuse regulations, it is helpful to observe that 
there are two particular aspects of Subchapter K that make it susceptible to abuse.  First, 
Subchapter K contains a number of very specific rules that dictate tax consequences that 
do not adequately follow economic consequences.  These rules provide taxpayers with 
opportunities to generate tax results that deviate from economic reality.  One example of 
such a transaction would be the income stripping partnership where partnership income is 
allocated to a nontaxable partner in order to generate artificial losses that are then 
allocated to taxable partners.157  A second characteristic of Subchapter K that makes it 
ripe for abuse is that it takes a schizophrenic view of partnerships; it treats partnerships as 
entities for certain purposes and as an aggregate of its members for other purposes. 
Transactions taking advantage of this aspect of Subchapter K focus on the interaction of 
Subchapter K with general provisions found outside of the partnership arena.  In such 
interactions, the question often arises whether the partnership should be treated as an 
entity distinct from its partners or whether the partnership’s activities should be treated as 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., Stanley Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management 
of Tax Detail, 34 L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969) (noting that the use of standards allow less 
lengthy rules to be adopted); David A. Weisbach, Costs of Departures From Formalism: Formalism in the 
Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 861–62 (1999) (same). 
157 The ACM case, discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 123 to 124, is a good example of an 
income stripping transaction.  
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engaged in individually by each partner.158  Since there is no principled basis to 
determine which treatment should apply, taxpayers select whichever is more favorable 
for that transaction. 
In its final form, the regulations contain two separate rules: the “abuse of 
subchapter K rule,”159 which targets perceived abuses of the rules contained in subchapter 
K, and the “abuse of entity rule,”160 which deals with how Subchapter K interfaces with 
Code provisions outside of Subchapter K.161  
 The abuse of Subchapter K rule states that: 
… if a partnership is formed or availed of in connection with a 
transaction a principal purpose of which is to reduce substantially 
the present value of the partners’ aggregate federal tax liability in a 
manner which is inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K, the 
Commissioner can recast the transaction for federal tax 
purposes….162 
 
The rule requires the Service to make two subjective determinations:  (1) the taxpayer’s 
motivation to reduce tax liability and (2) the intent of Subchapter K.  Since well-advised 
taxpayers generally try to plan their transactions to reduce their federal tax liability, the 
key will be to determine whether the structure of the transaction and the resulting tax 
consequences are consistent with the “intent of subchapter K.” 
The regulation provides a working definition of  “the intent of subchapter K.”  
According to the regulation, Subchapter K is intended “to permit taxpayers to conduct 
joint business (including investment) activities through a flexible economic arrangement 
                                                 
158See Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 1996), where the Court of Appeals 
reversed the Tax Court’s holding that the activities of a partnership should be treated as though engaged in 
directly by its partners for purposes of applying the controlled foreign corporation rules of Subpart F. 
159 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-2(b) (as amended in 1995). 
160 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-2(e) (as amended in 1995). 
161 These terms were coined in MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS ¶ 1.05[1] (3d ed. 1997).  
162 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (as amended in 1995).  If the rule is triggered, the Commissioner can, among 
other things, disregard the partnership, adjust the  accounting methods of both the partnership and the 
partners, and reallocate the partnership’s items of income and loss. 
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without incurring an entity level tax.”163  This general statement of intent is not 
particularly controversial, nor is it particularly helpful in identifying abuse.  Therefore, 
the regulation goes on to state that implicit in this intent are the following three 
requirements: 
1. The partnership must be bona fide and each transaction, or series of transactions 
must be entered into for a substantial business purpose, 
2. The form of the transaction must be respected under the substance over form 
principles, and  
3. The tax consequences to each partner and the partnership must accurately reflect 
their economic agreement and clearly reflect the partner’s income. This third 
requirement is referred to as the “proper reflection of income” requirement. 
                        Recognizing that not all statutory and regulatory provisions in Subchapter K have 
been adopted to properly measure income,164 the regulation states that if the first two 
implicit requirements are met, the proper reflection of income requirement is also 
considered met as long as the manner in which the particular provision is applied to the 
transaction and the “ultimate” tax results are “clearly contemplated by the provision.”165  
Note that this provision of the regulation in effect requires that the purposivist method of 
statutory interpretation be used in analyzing Subchapter K. 
Ultimately, whether a particular transaction runs afoul of the abuse of 
Subchapter K rule, is a question of facts and circumstances.  The regulation lists several 
factors to consider, the most important of which is a comparison of the purported 
                                                 
163 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (as amended in 1995). 
164 Other goals include simplicity, certainty and flexibility. 
165 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995). 
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business purpose for the transaction and the claimed tax benefits resulting therefrom.166  
In Treasury’s view, apparently, even if one has a bona fide business purpose for planning 
a transaction in a certain way, if the claimed tax consequences are too favorable, the 
transaction may not be respected.  To make this determination, one must compare the 
magnitude of the business purpose (measured in whatever units are appropriate) to the 
amount of the anticipated tax savings (presumably measured in dollars). 
The abuse of entity rule is somewhat narrower than the abuse of Subchapter K 
rule.  It states “[t]he Commissioner can treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners 
in whole or in part as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”) and the regulations there under.”167  This rule also imposes the 
purposivist method of interpretation and vests the Commissioner with discretion to 
determine when it is appropriate to treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners 
instead of as an entity.  The only explicit limitation on this discretion is that it does not 
apply if two conditions are met:  First the Code or regulations specifically prescribes 
                                                 
166 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c) (as amended in 1995).  The seven other listed factors are: 
1. The present value of the partners’ aggregate federal tax liability is substantially less than it 
would have been if the partners had owned the partnership’s assets directly. 
2. The present value of the partners’ aggregate federal tax liability is substantially less than it 
would have been if purportedly separate transactions are integrated into a single transaction. 
3. One or more partners who are necessary to achieve the desired tax results are substantially 
protected from loss and have little or no participation in the profits of the partnership. 
4. Substantially all partners are related to one another. 
5. Partnership items are allocated in compliance with the literal language of §§ 1.704-1 and 
1.704-2 but with results that are inconsistent with the purpose of section 704(b) and those 
regulations.  In this regard, particular scrutiny will be paid to special allocations to partners 
who are effectively in the zero bracket.  
6. The benefits and burdens of ownership of partnership property nominally contributed to a 
partnership are substantially retained by the contributor. 
7. The benefits and burdens of ownership of partnership property are substantially shifted to the 
distributee partner before or after the property is actually distributed. 
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1995). 
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entity treatment and, second, the ultimate tax results of that treatment “are clearly 
contemplated.”168 
C. Validity of the Anti-Abuse Regulations  
Most of the literature that has discussed the partnership anti-abuse regulations has 
been very critical.  Indeed, two former commissioners of the IRS, Donald C. 
Alexander169 and Lawrence B. Gibbs,170 asked the IRS to withdraw the regulations.  
Although the criticisms take various forms,171 their underlying theme is the same: In the 
absence of a specific legislative mandate, Treasury does not have the authority to impose 
overarching standards on Subchapter K that have the effect of overriding specific 
statutory provisions.   
These criticisms are well-illustrated by Example 8 of the regulations.  In this 
example, A owns land with a fair market value of $60 in which he has a basis of $100.  
Rather than selling the land and realizing a $40 loss, A entered into the following 
transaction, which, if respected, would have the effect of doubling the amount of the loss: 
                                                 
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(2) (as amended in 1995). 
169 Letter, from Donald C. Alexander, et al, to the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy (August 18, 1995), 
reprinted in 95 TNT 175-28.  See Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Ex-Government Official, Challenge 
Partnership Anti-Abuse Reg: An Analysis, 69 TAX NOTES 1395 (1995) (summarizing letters). 
170 Letter from Lawrence B. Gibbs, et al to the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy  (August 23, 1995), 
reprinted in 95 TNT 175–27. 
171 These criticisms primarily take five forms.  First, critics argue that the language of Subchapter K, the 
legal context of its adoption in 1954, and its subsequent development all indicate that the existence of a tax 
avoidance motive is irrelevant to the determination of “whether a partnership is bona fide, whether a 
transaction has sufficient business purpose, and whether the form of the transaction is respected for tax 
purposes.”  See, e.g., McKee & Kuller, supra note 151; McKee, Nelson, and Whitmire, supra note 151, at 
7.  Second, the critics assert that the proper reflection-of-income standard finds “no support in the statute, 
the legislative history, or the case law.”  Gouwar, supra note 151, at 287; McKee & Kuller, supra note 151. 
Third, the critics state that to the extent that there is uncertainty in the statutory scheme of Subchapter K 
about the role of business purpose, economic substance and the proper reflection of income, the regulation 
is not a reasonable interpretation of Congressional intent. Id.; Letter from Donald C. Alexander, et al, to the 
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (August 18, 1995), reprinted in 95 TNT 125-28.  Fourth, some have 
suggested that it is inappropriate for a regulatory agency, like the IRS, to adopt formally judicial standards.  
Letter from the Tax Section of the Philadelphia Bar Ass’n (June 30, 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT 140-31.  
Fifth, the critics argue that the regulations are invalid to the extent they purport to overrule the literal 
application of several specific provisions of Subchapter K. Letter from Charles Levin, Chair of the Federal 
Taxation Committee of the Chicago Bar Ass’n (June 30, 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT139-61. 
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A and two family members form a partnership to which A contributes the land and the 
family members each contribute $30 of cash.  Under the partnership provisions, A’s basis 
in his partnership interest and partnership’s basis in the land are both $100.172  The 
partnership invests the total cash of $60 in an investment asset, which is not a marketable 
security.  The partnership leases the land to B, an unrelated party, and gives B an option 
to purchase the land at the end of year 3 for its then fair market value.  In year 3, the 
partnership liquidates A’s interest by distributing the investment asset (which still has a 
value of $60) to A.  Under Subchapter K, A takes a basis in the asset of $100173 to 
preserve his $40 loss.  At the end of year 3, the partnership sells the land to B for $60, 
recognizing an additional $40 loss, which is allocated equally between the two family 
members.  Note that, in effect, the original $40 built-in loss in the land has been 
duplicated.174  The example concludes that the IRS may “recast” the transaction to deny 
the duplicate losses, in part, because “ . . . any purported business purpose for the 
transaction is insignificant in comparison to the tax benefits that would result if the 
transaction were respected for Federal tax purposes.”175   
                                                 
172 I.R.C. §§ 722, 723 (Thompson 2004). 
173 I.R.C. § 732(b) (Thompson 2004). 
174 B and C will enjoy the duplicated loss until they sell or liquidate the partnership.  The outside basis of B 
and C has been reduced to $10 ($30 original basis less the $20 allocated loss), while the partnership holds 
$60 cash.  If B or C was to sell or liquidate her partnership interest, she would recognize $20 of gain ($30 
cash received less $10 basis). 
 It is important to note that the tax benefit claimed by B and C in the example is not dependent on 
the value of the contributed property (the land) remaining unchanged.  The critical factor for duplicating the 
tax benefit is that the partnership avoid selling or distributing the land while A is a partner.  If the 
partnership continues to hold the land after A’s exit, the remaining partners will be entitled to a tax benefit 
of  $40 in the form of a deduction or exclusion regardless of what happens to the land’s value.  To 
illustrate, suppose both the land and the investment asset both go up in value to $100 at the time of A’s 
liquidation.  Economically, the partnership’s assets have appreciated $80 in value since formation, $40 of 
which is allocable to A and $40 of which is allocable to the two family members.  After A’s interest is 
liquidated in exchange for the investment asset, the partnership continues to hold the land, its only asset, 
with a value and a basis of $100.  The partnership does not have any unrealized tax appreciation in its 
assets, even though the two family members have an aggregate economic gain of $40. 
175 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Ex. (8) (as amended in 1995). 
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            In the absence of the anti-abuse rule, the Service could have attacked this 
transaction using one or more of the existing judicial doctrines (e.g., business purpose 
doctrine or economic substance).176  Nevertheless, the critics of the rule insist that it is 
improper for the Treasury to impose these judicial doctrines (or variations thereof) by 
regulation and that the rule is an abuse of administrative power.  In this part, we evaluate 
the critics’ position.  Although the critics have been strident (sometimes even shrill) in 
stating their positions, their arguments have not been made in the normal framework used 
to determine the validity of regulations.  We identify the appropriate standard of review 
for assessing the validity of tax regulations by exploring two unsettled issues.  The first is 
whether regulations issued under § 7805 are legislative regulations, entitled to significant 
deference, or interpretative regulations, entitled to less deference.  Historically, both the 
tax bar and the courts have referred to § 7805  regulations as “interpretive.”  
Nevertheless, we argue that if properly analyzed, these regulations are legislative in 
nature.  The second issue is whether the same standard that has been developed for non-
tax regulations should apply to § 7805 regulations, or whether a different standard 
developed exclusively for tax regulations should apply.  The Supreme Court has created 
quite a bit of needless confusion concerning this second issue.  Nevertheless, we believe 
that the resolution of this issue is not meaningful and the differences between the two 
standards are not substantive, but semantic.  Finally, we analyze the anti-abuse rule under 
these standards and determine that they are valid.   
                                                 
176 For example, the IRS could argue that the partnership should be disregarded in this transaction because 
it served no business purpose.  See Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879, 881–83 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(court disregarded partnership because it lacked economic substance). 
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1. Standards of Review of Regulations – In General 
Judicial review of the validity of administrative regulations is complex since 
courts owe varying degrees of deference to the different types of administrative 
regulations.  Courts generally classify regulations as “legislative” or “interpretive,” but, 
as discussed below, the classification of tax regulations issued under § 7805, such as the 
partnership anti-abuse regulation, is not certain.177  In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,178 the Supreme Court ruled that a significant degree of 
judicial deference is required in reviewing legislative regulations.  As long as the 
regulation is a permissible construction of the statute, the regulation must be sustained.  
On the other hand, significantly less deference – so-called Skidmore deference – is 
granted to interpretive regulations.179  In Chevron, the Court created a two-part test to 
describe its limited role in reviewing legislative regulations:180 
 When a court reviews an agency’s construction of 
the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
                                                 
177 As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 186 to 194, the definition of a “legislative” or 
“administrative” regulation depends upon the context. 
178 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). The Chevron case involved a legislative regulation that the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") had first promulgated in 1980 and that had adopted the prior rulings of two 
Courts of Appeals.  In 1981, however, a new administration adopted a modified version of the regulation, 
which rejected the prior judicial pronouncements. In upholding the new regulations, the Court articulated a 
new two-part test, which is described infra at the text accompanying note 180. 
179 Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).   
180 467 U.S. at 842. 
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agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute. 
 
In contrast, the Court described its much less deferential role in reviewing interpretive 
regulations in Skidmore v. Swift when it stated, “We consider that the rulings, 
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”181 
A leading treatise on administrative law and law review article state that Chevron 
applies to regulations promulgated under § 7805, such as the partnership anti-abuse 
regulation.182  Although we agree that Chevron should apply, its application remains in 
some doubt for two reasons.  First, it is not clear whether § 7805 regulations are in fact 
legislative regulations.  Indeed, Treasury and the courts routinely refer to these 
regulations as “interpretive.”  Second, prior to the Chevron decision, a separate body of 
law had developed evaluating § 7805 regulations and it is not clear how this body of law 
relates to Chevron.  Although there is a unanimous Supreme Court opinion directly on 
point,183 which applies Chevron to a § 7805 regulation, a subsequent Supreme Court 
opinion ignored its existence184 and the lower courts remain split.185  These issues are 
discussed below. 
                                                 
181 323 U.S. at 140.  This position was recently reaffirmed in United States v. Mead. 533 U.S. 218, 221 
(2001). 
182 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.05 (2002); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and 
the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 751 (Winter 2002).  
183 Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1996). 
184 United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 218–29 (2001). 
185 See infra notes 200–213 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Legislative and Interpretive Regulations 
  a. Non-Tax Cases    
Distinguishing between legislative and interpretive186 regulations is one of the 
most fundamental and litigious issues in administrative law outside the tax area.  
Although conceptually these rules are quite different, it is often very difficult to 
distinguish between them in practice.  A legislative regulation is one that is based on a 
congressional delegation to fill in the gaps of an incomplete statute.  It creates new duties 
or obligations that are binding on all parties.187  Because legislative regulations have the 
force of law, they are subject to the notice and comment procedure of the Administrative 
Procedure Act [“APA”].  Failure to follow these procedures will result in the rule being 
invalidated.  
Interpretive regulations, on the other hand, do not create new law; they merely 
interpret existing law.  These rules do not bind either the agency or other parties and are 
merely a statement of what the agency believes is the proper interpretation.  If an issue 
involving the interpretive rule is litigated, a court will interpret the underlying statute, not 
the regulation, and is not bound by the agency’s interpretation.  The courts, however, 
typically have given to interpretive rules so-called “Skidmore deference,” which was 
described above.  
As a practical matter, distinguishing between legislative and interpretive 
regulations has been extremely problematic.  “The prevailing approach is to treat a rule as 
legislative if either the purpose or the effect of the rule is legislative.  Thus, a rule is 
                                                 
186 The APA speaks in terms of “interpretative.”  5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (2004); see Clarry v. United States, 85 
F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
187 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (opinion letter not subject to Chevron 
deference because it lacked the “force of law,” i.e., it was not binding on all parties). 
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legislative if the agency’s purpose was to use its legislative rulemaking power.  A rule is 
also legislative if it has a legislative effect––if it is a self-executing change in the law—
regardless of the agency’s intention.”188  The difficulty in drawing this distinction is a 
function of at least two factors.  First, a rule that simply interprets a statute is not 
necessarily an interpretive rule; legislative rules also interpret statutes.  Second, the 
presence of a legislative delegation to provide for rules does not necessarily mean that an 
agency must use that delegation to interpret the underlying statute.189  “Thus, the 
presence of a delegated power is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to establish that 
a rule is legislative.”190   
The delegated power need not be a specific legislative mandate.  It is not unusual 
in other areas of administrative law to have provisions similar to § 7805(a) that confer 
general rule making authority to the relevant agency to implement the statute.191  
Although it was not always the case, it is now generally accepted that legislative rules 
may be promulgated under these general provisions.192  The issue is whether the purpose 
or the effect of the rule in question is legislative.   
In recent years the tendency of the courts in hard cases has been to classify a 
questionable rule as legislative.  For example, consider the following:    
                                                 
188 Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW 
343, 353–54 (1991). 
189 An example of this in the tax area are the regulations issued under I.R.C. § 469 (Thompson 2004).  
Section 469(l) specifically delegates to the Secretary of Treasury the power to promulgate regulations to 
implement § 469.  Nevertheless, when the Treasury issued regulations under this provision, it insisted that 
they were interpretive.  These issues and these regulations are discussed extensively in Asimow, supra note 
188, at 350–61.  
190 Id. 
191 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With The Force of Law:  The Original 
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 575 (2002). 
192 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001) (observing that general rule making 
authority can result in legislative regulations); Merrill & Watts, supra note 191, at 575. 
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Accordingly, insofar as our cases can be reconciled at all, we think 
it almost exclusively on the basis of whether the purported 
interpretive rule has ‘legal effect,’ which in turn is best ascertained 
by asking (1) whether in the absence of the rule there would not be 
an adequate legislative basis for … enforcement …; (2) whether 
the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its 
general legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively 
amends a prior legislative rule.  If the answer to any of these 
questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive 
rule.193 
 
Of these four factors, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of notice and 
an opportunity for public comment in determining whether a regulation is 
legislative in nature and entitled to Chevron deference.194  
 b.   Tax Cases 
 Under the general standard developed above,  § 7805 regulations would be 
classified as legislative:  At a minimum they are promulgated under a legislative 
mandate, issued for notice and comment, and published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.   Moreover, the grant of authority in § 7805 is very similar to 
authority granted to other agencies whose regulations receive Chevron 
deference.195  The tax law, however, to date has not used the traditional distinction 
between legislative and interpretive rules.  Treasury has always characterized the 
regulations that it promulgates under the general authority of § 7805(a) as 
“interpretive” regulations; only those regulations promulgated pursuant to a 
specific legislative mandate are classified as “legislative.”  This distinction is 
widely accepted by both the tax bar and the courts.   
                                                 
193 Truckers United for Safety v. FHA, 139 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
194 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; see Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (agency guideline not entitled 
to Chevron deference because it was not “subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedures Act, 
including public notice and comment”). 
195 Merrill & Watts, supra note 191, at 575. 
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 Even though Treasury refers to § 7805 regulations as “interpretive,” the courts 
have not applied the low-level deference of Skidmore.  In contrast to non-tax interpretive 
regulations, tax regulations have always commanded significant deference from the 
courts.  In 1979, five years before Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court held in 
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States,196 that courts should defer to a 
regulation issued under § 7805 if it “implements the Congressional mandate in some 
reasonable manner.”197  The Court said this determination is made by asking “whether the 
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin and purpose.” 198  
To make clear that National Muffler requires a great deal of deference for § 7805 
regulations, the Court emphasized that the “choice among reasonable interpretations is 
for the Commissioner, not the courts.”199  
The Supreme Court has never clarified how National Muffler should be applied 
after Chevron, although it has had several opportunities.200  When it analyzes regulations 
issued under § 7805, it often cites National Muffler without mentioning Chevron, leaving 
some with the impression that Chevron does not apply to these tax regulations.201  
Finally, in 1999, the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion, Atlantic Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Commissioner, applied Chevron to a § 7805 regulation.202   However, it did so 
without even mentioning National Muffler or acknowledging the confused state of the 
                                                 
196 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979). 
197 Id. (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)). 
198 Relevant considerations include “the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed 
on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has 
devoted to the regulation during subsequent enactments of the statute.” Id. at 477. 
199 Id. at 488. 
200 See Ellen Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51, 75 (1996); 
John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron 
Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 57–63 (1995).  
201 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 120 (1996); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. 
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1991); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1984). 
202 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1999). 
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law.203  The resolution of this issue became even murkier when, in 2001, the Supreme 
Court had another § 7805 regulation before it.  This time, however, it applied National 
Muffler without mentioning Chevron.204  Subsequently, in 2003, the Supreme Court 
appeared to apply the Chevron standard to a § 7805 regulation, but without citing either 
Chevron or National Muffler.205  The result has been confusion as the various courts of 
appeal and Tax Court have sought to address the impact of developments in 
administrative law to the tax law.206  The Sixth Circuit has held that Chevron applies to  
§ 7805 regulations207 and that Chevron requires greater deference than National 
Muffler.208  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit209 and the Tax Court210 have explicitly stated 
that there is no substantive difference between the Chevron and National Muffler 
standard. The Ninth Circuit has declined to rule on the issue, but has continued to apply 
National Muffler.211  The Fifth Circuit has determined that Chevron does not apply to 
regulations issued under § 7805.212 
                                                 
203 It is possible that the Court believed that the regulation at issue was based upon a specific legislative 
mandate and not under § 7805.   
204 Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. at 218–19.  Adding to the confusion, in the same year, the 
Court approvingly cited Atlantic Mutual in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231 n.12, as an 
example of the proper application of Chevron.   
205 Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 451 (2003).  The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Boeing as 
applying the Chevron standard.  Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 140–41 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
206 For a succinct summary of this confusion, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 
(2d Cir. 2001); Aprill, supra note 200, at 75–77. 
207 Hosp. Corp. of Am. 348 F.3d at 140–41. 
208 Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Commissioner, 948 F. 2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991).  The Sixth Circuit, 
however, applies Chevron to § 7805 regulations.  Nichols v. United States, 260 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 2001). 
209 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 981–82 (7th Cir. 1999). 
210 Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass’n v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384 (1995). 
211 Pac. First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating “We need not 
decide whether Chevron applies to the regulations in this case, however, because the traditional rule of 
deference . . . supports our decision to uphold the challenged regulations.”).  
212 Nalle v. Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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            We agree with those who have concluded that there is no significant difference 
between the standards set forth in Chevron and National Muffler.213  Chevron’s two-
stepped analysis is  really a detailed restatement of National Muffler’s analytic 
approach.214  The Court in  Chevron held that the first step is to ask whether Congress has 
specifically addressed the subject of the regulation.  It explained that, in that situation, 
neither the courts nor an administrative agency should alter the expressed intent of 
Congress since Congress is the repository of all legislative authority within Constitutional 
constraints.  Even though a court or the agency might strongly disagree with the policy 
choice expressed in the statute, they must interpret and apply the law as written.  As a 
practical matter, however, a statute never addresses all the possible policy issues that 
might arise.215 Chevron’s holding interprets a statute’s silence as an implied delegation 
by Congress to an agency to address issues not addressed in the statute.216   In the absence 
of any administrative action, a court may be called upon to resolve a policy issue in a 
case that is brought before it.  If, however, the administrative agency resolves a policy 
issue through a legislative rule, the courts must defer to the agency judgment because 
administrative agencies are more politically accountable than courts:217  
[The Judiciary is] not part of either political branch of government.  In contrast, 
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibility may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
                                                 
213 See, e.g.,  David Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the Post-Chevron Era, 13 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997). 
214 If National Muffler has independent significance after Chevron, it is that it identifies various historical 
considerations that are relevant in determining whether a regulation implements a congressional mandate in 
a proper manner.   
215 Some of the reasons for this include lack of time, foresight, or the process of collective decision 
making.  PIERCE, supra note 182, § 3.3. 
216 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 870–71 (2001). 
217 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2086, 
2130 (2002); Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 
(1990). 
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administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies are 
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of Government to make such policy 
choices.”218 
 Chevron’s step one has little application to tax regulations promulgated under 
§ 7805(a), if the regulation does not conflict with the statute’s language.  Section 7805(a) 
mandates that the Treasury prescribe “all needful rules… for the enforcement” of the 
Code. “[N]eedful” is obviously not self-defining, and we know of no case where a court 
has struck down a regulation on the basis of being “unneedful.”  For this reason, it is not 
surprising that the Supreme Court in National Muffler did not provide the detail 
contained in step one of the Chevron test.  Nevertheless, by asking “whether the 
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin and purpose,” the  
National Muffler standard requires a determination of whether the statute speaks to the 
subject matter of the regulation.      
               Chevron’s step two asks whether the rule adopted by the administrative agency 
is a “permissible construction” of the statute.219  The court in Chevron elaborated that a 
“permissible” interpretation is one that is “reasonable.”220  To be reasonable, the 
regulation need not be “the reading the Court would have reached if the question initially 
had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”221  The nature of the test for “reasonableness” is not 
clear.222  The Supreme Court has only used Chevron’s step two to strike down regulations 
                                                 
218 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
219 Id. at 842. 
220 Id. at 845. 
221 Id. at 843 n.11. 
222 See, e.g.,  Michael Abramowicz, Regulatory Law: Toward A Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1730–31 (2002). 
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in two cases.223  Both cases suggest that a regulation is unreasonable where the regulation 
extends beyond the scope of Congress’ implied delegation of authority.224  Some 
commentators and lower courts have also suggested that reasonableness occurs when a 
regulation is not arbitrary and capricious.225  In a recent dissent, Justice Breyer has 
suggested that the standard requires a showing of a “rational connection” between the 
regulation and the statute’s purpose.226 
             Using language almost identical to that of Chevron, the Court in National Muffler 
made clear that the regulation must interpret the statute in “some reasonable manner” and 
that the interpretation need not be one that the court would have reached.227  Even in 
those cases where a particular regulation has been in potential conflict with the literal 
language of the statute, the Court has granted Treasury’s interpretation a great deal of 
deference under National Muffler.228  Since 1980, the Court had found tax regulations to 
be unreasonable in only two cases.229  In both, the Court determined that regulations 
                                                 
223 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 391-92 (1999); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 
431 U.S. 457, 484–85 (2001). 
224 In AT&T, the Court held that an FCC regulation was not reasonable because the FCC had misunderstood 
the scope of authority delegated to it.  See 525 U.S. at 391-92.  In Whitman v. American Trucking  Ass’n, 
the Court struck down a regulation as unreasonable because, although it addressed ambiguities in the 
statute, it also contradicted a part of the statute that was quite clear. 431 U.S. at 484–85. 
225 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 182, § 3.6; Animal League Def. Fund v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 234 
(D.C. Cir. 2000).  Richard Pierce states that a regulation is arbitrary and capricious: 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important part of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 
PIERCE, supra note 182, § 3.6. 
226 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 540–42 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
227 Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 488. 
228 See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1967) (“overnight rule” found to be a 
reasonable interpretation of “away from home”). 
229 See Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 224–26 (1984); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 
253 (1981). 
 54
clearly contradicted Congressional purpose.230  Such a finding is consistent with a 
determination that the regulation was outside of the agency’s delegated authority, the 
same determination that the Court has made in invalidating regulations under step two of 
Chevron. 
 3.  Application of Chevron and National Muffler to the Anti-Abuse Regulations 
The critics argue that Treasury does not have the authority to impose overarching 
standards on Subchapter K that override specific statutory provisions.  Indeed, the anti-
abuse regulations are not typical.  Although the IRS has incorporated common law anti-
abuse doctrines in other regulations, including corporate tax regulations,231 the 
partnership anti-abuse regulations expand the judicial doctrines and impose a purposivist 
method of statutory interpretation.  With apparently no statutory authority, the abuse of 
Subchapter K rule not only requires that there be a business purpose, but also that it be 
“substantial.”232  In addition,  it requires a “proper” reflection of income in a transaction.  
Income is properly reflected when application of the statute to the transaction and the 
“ultimate” tax result is “clearly contemplated by the provision.”233  Also, the abuse of 
                                                 
230 In Engle, the Court struck down the Service’s application of a proposed regulation that denied a 
depletion allowance for advance royalty payments.  464 U.S. at 224–26.  The Court reasoned that such 
application “unreasonably denies . . . [the taxpayer] a subsidy Congress expressly contemplated it should 
receive.” Id. at 226.  In Rowan, the Court invalidated regulations that treated employer-provided housing as 
wages subject to withholding for FICA and FUTA where the “plain language and legislative histories of the 
relevant Acts indicate that Congress intended” otherwise. See 452 U.S. at 263. 
231 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.301-1(l)(as amended in 2003), 1.351-1(b)(1)(as amended in 1996), 1.355-
2(b)(as amended in 1989), 1.368-1(b)(as amended in 2001), 1.368-2(a)(as amended in 2003) and 1.446-
3(i)(as amended in 1994); see also Pamela Olson, Some Thoughts on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 817, 
820 (1995) (listing additional regulations). 
232 Whether or not a business purpose is substantial is determined by comparing the magnitude of the 
business purpose to the tax benefits of the transaction. Treas. Reg. §1.701-2(d) Ex. (2) (as amended in 
1995). 
233 Treas. Reg. §1.701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995). 
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entity regulation allows the Service to disregard a partnership if “appropriate to carry out 
the purpose of any provision of the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”234  
Although the critics do not refer to Chevron or National Muffler, as discussed 
above, it is necessary that an analysis of the regulation’s validity consider these cases.  
Thus, the analysis has to determine whether the statute addresses the subject matter of the 
regulation and whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.  The 
outcome of these determinations may depend on the method of statutory interpretation 
employed.  As noted earlier, intentionalists, purposivists and those who subscribe to 
dynamic interpretation are willing to look at legislative history to interpret a statute. 
Textualists are not, except to determine the background context of the legislation where 
such background may be independently verified.235  In Chevron, itself, the Court said that 
all the traditional tools of statutory interpretation should be used236 and proceeded to 
examine the statute’s legislative history.  The ascendancy of textualism, however, 
currently creates doubt about the role of legislative history.237   
                                                 
 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
234 Treas. Reg. 1.701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1995). 
235
236 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
237 Not surprisingly, courts have employed different interpretive methods in determining whether tax 
regulations are valid.  For example, the Sixth Circuit has examined both the language and legislative 
history of a Code provision to determine whether it addresses the subject of regulations.  Peoples Fed. Sav. 
& Loan v. United States, 948 F.2d 289, 294–300 (6th Cir. 1991). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit does not 
examine legislative history in determining whether the statute speaks to regulations in Chevron step one. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998).  Instead, it will only examine 
legislative history in step two after it determines that the statutory provision is silent or ambiguous.  Id. 
Similarly the Tax Court in recent decisions has used the textualist method, looking to the ordinary usage 
and settled meaning of the words, to interpret code provisions.  Tutor-Saliba v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 1, 
8 (2000).  If the Tax Court finds the provision to be ambiguous or silent about the subject of the regulation, 
it then examines the provision’s legislative history to determine whether the regulation is consistent with 
the provision’s origin and purpose.  Id. at 9.  For an insightful analysis of the different approaches of the 
courts, see Aprill, supra note 200, at 81–87. 
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               Textualists agree that authorities existing at the time of enactment (such as case 
law and possibly treatises) are an important interpretive aid.238  The case law that existed 
at the time Subchapter K was enacted clearly shows that Congress left some gaping holes 
in the statute.  At the time of the statute’s adoption, the business purpose, substance-over-
form and step transaction doctrines were already well-developed and part of the tax 
landscape.  Gregory v. Helvering, the seminal case, which  established that the business 
purpose and substance-over-form doctrine could override express corporate tax provision, 
had been on the books for 20 years.  Similarly, the step transaction doctrines had existed 
for 11 years.239 Although these doctrines had emerged in the context of corporate 
reorganizations, their application was far broader.   Several courts had applied the 
doctrines to transactions involving partnerships prior to the adoption of Subchapter K 
with the result that they would often disregard the partnership as an entity separate from 
its partners.240  None of the tax statutes existing at that time expressly authorized these 
doctrines, but the courts applied them to override express statutory provisions by 
employing the purposivist method of statutory interpretation.  Commentators were well 
aware of these developments.  Randolph Paul, a well-known tax lawyer and author 
during that period, was clearly troubled when he stated in 1954:   
… [The courts’] fear of usurping the legislative function diminished as 
judicial legislation became more and more recognized as one of the facts 
                                                 
238 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
239 The Supreme Court applied the step transaction doctrine to corporate tax in Commissioner v. Court 
Holding Co.  324 U.S. 331 (1945). 
240 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286–88 (1946) (partnership disregarded where 
taxpayers did not intend to carry on a business as partners); Kocin v. United States, 187 F.2d 707, 708 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (per curiam) (partnership disregarded because it lacked business purpose); Shaffer Terminals v. 
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 356, 363–64 (1951) (partnership formed by corporation’s shareholders to lease 
equipment to corporation was not treated as tax owner of the equipment under the substance-over-form 
doctrine). 
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of legal life, and not something for which apology must be made at bar 
association conventions.241 
      The existence of these doctrines and the use of the purposivist method of statutory 
interpretation at the time of Subchapter K’s adoption are key because they squarely 
confronted Congress with the issue whether, as a policy matter, the doctrines should 
apply when interpreting the partnership tax provisions.  Congress had the authority to 
direct the courts to use a specific method of statutory interpretation in analyzing a 
statute242 and to codify judicial doctrines, but it didn’t.243  Congress also clearly 
contemplated that it might become necessary for the IRS to delineate the circumstances 
in which a partnership should be disregarded, but Congress did not address that concern 
in the statutes.  The 1954 Conference Committee Report, which accompanied the 
enactment of Subchapter K, stated: 
No inference is intended … that a partnership is to be considered as a separate  
entity for the purpose of applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws if 
the concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is more appropriate 
for such provisions.244 
                                                 
241 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 660 (1954). 
242 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2086, 2103–
10 (2002) (arguing that definitional and statute specific methods of interpretation may be constitutionally 
mandated by Congress). 
243 Indeed, Congress did make the call in another part of the same legislation in which it adopted 
Subchapter K.  In § 671, Congress specifically reversed the Supreme Court’s application of the substance-
over-form doctrine in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335–36 (1940), where the Court had treated a 
taxpayer who controlled a trust as the owner of the trust assets.  S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 86-
87, 364-72 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 65-57  (1954).  Section 671 rejected the 
Court’s holding in Clifford, stating in part: 
 No items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable income and credits of the 
 grantor or of any other person solely on the grounds of his dominion and control over the   
  trust . . . . 
244 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954).  Textualists will look to legislative history to 
determine the background context of the legislation where such background may be independently verified.  
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  The case law that disregarded the partnership as a separate 
entity independently verifies that Congress was aware that an issue existed about when it was appropriate 
to disregard the partnership. 
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By remaining silent, Congress impliedly delegated the authority to Treasury to make 
these calls.245 
 Having established that the statute does not address the subject matter of the 
regulations,  step two asks whether the regulations interpret the statute in a reasonable 
manner.  Is the expansion of the business purpose doctrine reasonable?  Is the designation 
of purposivism as the method to interpret Subchapter K and to determine when a 
partnership should be disregarded reasonable?  We believe the answer to all these 
questions is yes.  The implied delegation from Congress necessarily included the ability 
to modify and adapt judicial doctrines existing in 1954 to changed circumstances.  In 
1954, the courts, themselves, were refining the judicial doctrines of business purpose and 
substance-over-form.  This evolution has continued in the past decade as some courts 
have started to compare the profit potential in a transaction to the tax benefits to ascertain 
whether a tax shelter has economic substance.246  Moreover, as discussed earlier, courts 
traditionally used the purposivist method of interpretation and frequently employed it to 
disregard partnerships.247  Although one might disagree with the correctness of these 
judicial actions,248 the courts’ actions strongly support the conclusion that the regulations’ 
designation of these tools is a reasonable choice among several options.249  
                                                 
245 Purposivists and intentionalists would also look to the legislative history and observe that Congress was  
thinking about corporations, as well as partnerships when it adopted Subchapter K. The committee reports 
make clear that Subchapter K was intended to be a flexible, simple set of provisions designed for business 
enterprises, especially those run by small entrepreneurs and farmers.  H. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 
4091 (1954); Sen. Rep. No. 8300, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 4721-4722 (1954).  There is nothing in the reports to 
suggest that partnerships should be exempt from well-established judicial doctrines.  This legislative 
history is very similar to that relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Gregory v. Helvering in formulating 
the business purpose and substance-over-form doctrines.  See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 99 to 104 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
248  It is important to recognize that the validity of the regulations is not dependent on one’s views as to 
whether cases such as Gregory v. Helvering were properly decided.  See 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
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Gregory v. Helvering was an aggressive judicial opinion.  Neither the statute nor the legislative history 
directly imposed a ‘business purpose requirement.’  Nevertheless, the Court used the legislative history to 
create one, and the debate continues today as to whether the Supreme Court properly decided this case.  See 
generally David Harriton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 Tax Law 235 (1999).  Of 
course, if one agrees with the decision in Gregory v. Helvering, then a fortiori, one must sustain the 
regulations.  Treasury has at least as much authority (possibly more) to interpret (construct) statutes as the 
courts.  If the courts have the authority to craft a business purpose doctrine, so does Treasury.  On the other 
hand, even if one disagrees with the decision in Gregory v. Helvering and believes that the Court exceeded 
its authority, one should still sustain these regulations.  Even if wrongly decided, by 1954 these doctrines 
had been well-developed by the Courts and had become part of the context that existed when Congress 
enacted Subchapter K. 
249 The regulation’s directive to use the purposivist method of interpretation does not violate separation of 
powers.  Any agency’s interpretation of a statute inevitably involves determining which method of 
interpretation will be weighed most heavily.  Since Congress has the authority to dictate the method of 
interpretation to be used to interpret a statute, see Rosenkranz, supra note 242, Congress can delegate that 
authority.  Such delegation occurs every time Congress asks an agency to interpret statutes.  Bernard W. 
Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-
Chevron Era, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 141 (1997). 
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                              IV.  The Wisdom of the Anti-abuse Regulations 
 In the previous section, we argued that the Treasury had the delegated power to 
promulgate the anti-abuse regulations.  In this section we examine whether the decision 
to exercise that power was wise.  On balance, we support Treasury’s decision to 
promulgate these regulations and believe that this technique might be used in other areas 
of the tax law.  We do, however, believe that the partnership anti-abuse regulations could 
be more effective and offer two recommendations towards that end.  
As discussed earlier, with the ascendancy of textualism, doubt arose as to whether 
(and how) the judicial doctrines would be applied to the partnership provisions.  The 
doubt resulted in a flurry of tax shelters, which in turn led Treasury to adopt the anti-
abuse regulations.  Anti-abuse regulations that reassert and expand the judicially created 
standards can be an effective way to counter textualism’s threat to the applicability of 
judicial doctrines to detailed statutory schemes.  Treasury’s adoption of the anti-abuse 
regulations reflects its determination that reasserting and expanding  the judicial 
standards was preferable to issuing a never-ending-stream of rules that address specific 
abuses.   
Rules and standards are generally viewed as alternative approaches.  The principal 
difference between the two is that the substantive content of the law is known before an 
individual acts in the case of rules, while the content of the law becomes known only 
after the individual acts in the case of standards.250  Depending on the circumstances, one 
approach may be preferable to, and more efficient than, the other.  The initial cost of 
employing rules is generally higher than that of standards, because the rule-maker must 
                                                 
250 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 
(1992). 
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identify those transactions that fall within a rule and those that do not.  Once a rule has 
been created, however, it offers citizens more certainty and is generally less costly to 
interpret and to apply than a standard.  Standards, on the other hand, are relatively 
inexpensive to implement, but much more costly to interpret and apply.  If a law 
addresses everyday behavior or a common transaction, a rule is generally preferable to a 
standard.  For example, when setting a speed limit for a particular highway, one might 
adopt a rule (e.g., 55 miles per hour) or a standard (“not too fast for conditions”).  Given 
the number of people who drive on the highway, and the range of weather conditions, it 
may be better to adopt the rule.  Under this regime, drivers, police and judges all know 
with certainty what the law is and it can be applied easily.  In contrast, the standard 
would be costly to interpret and adjudicate because there may be a whole range of views 
as to what “too fast for conditions” means.   If, however, the behavior or the transaction 
that is being regulated might arise in a variety of different factual circumstances, it would 
be difficult and expensive to create rules for each of those circumstances and a standard 
might be preferable. The law of negligence is a good example:  It is hard to imagine 
drafting a specific set of rules for every possible circumstance in which a person might be 
negligent.  At any rate it certainly would be wasteful to spend all of that energy thinking 
about possible negligent acts, no one of which is ever likely to occur.  Although one 
might want to develop rules for specific types of transactions that occur often (e.g., 
product liability), for those that are “uncommon” imposing a standard such as “the duty 
of reasonable care” would be more efficient.   
Anti-abuse standards are sometimes adopted as a back-stop for a set of simple 
rules.  What is unusual about the partnership anti-abuse regulations is that they impose a 
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standard on top of a set of extremely complex rules.  Although this is generally thought to 
be a poor idea because it increases complexity,251 this approach is justified in the context 
of tax shelter transactions.  The Internal Revenue Code (including Subchapter K) has 
been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, primarily a rule-based statute.  It is important 
that the “millions of taxpayers who engage in billions of transactions”252 be able to file 
annual tax returns with some degree of certainty without incurring huge compliance 
costs.  Nevertheless, there are situations in which standards can be usefully and 
efficiently employed to augment rules.  Many rules under the income tax create bright 
lines; tax consequences depend entirely on which side of the line the transaction falls.  
Although the rule may not track economic reality, the benefit derived from certainty is 
considered sufficiently important as long as the rule is applied to a real business 
transaction.253   Such rules, however, offer tax planners the opportunity to design 
transactions for which there is no purpose whatsoever except to take advantage of the tax 
benefits.254  Historically, the rule-maker did not worry about these tax-driven transactions 
because such transactions would not have passed muster under one or more of the 
existing judicial doctrines that imposed the standards of business purpose and economic 
substance.255  These judicial standards historically had applied in a variety of different 
circumstances and allowed the rule-based system to be less complex than it would 
                                                 
251 For example, Professor Weisbach, using the partnership anti-abuse regulations as an example, states that 
“it is not appropriate to add an anti-abuse rule on top of complex rules.”  David A. Weisbach, Cost 
Departures from Formalism: Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 882 (1999).   
252 Kaplow, supra note 250, at 573. 
253 See Weisbach, supra note 251, at 876–77. 
254 Id. at 874–75. 
255 Of course, if the tax consequences of such a transaction are respected, the transaction will become 
common. 
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otherwise have to be.256  Reassertion of the judicial standards, therefore, is merely 
restoring the safety net necessary to insure that rules operate effectively. 
  To evaluate further the wisdom of Treasury’s decision to reassert and expand the 
judicial standards, we consider four criteria proposed by Professor Weisbach for 
determining when an anti-abuse standard is preferable to rules.257  First, the problems 
addressed by the standard should be serious.258  Second, the anti-abuse standard should 
permit the underlying rules to be simplified. Third, the uncertainty created by the 
standard should not be so great as to outweigh the its expected benefits.  And finally, the 
anti-abuse standard should be effective. 
The first factor is the strongest one in favor of the partnership anti-abuse 
regulations: the problems created by the (not-so) simple rules of Subchapter K were very 
serious and had to be addressed.   As discussed in detail above, Subchapter K was the 
vehicle of choice for abusive transactions that Treasury was unable to address by 
adopting more rules.  These transactions were extremely harmful to the system in a 
variety of ways.  Not only were they draining revenue, but also they had the effect of 
undermining the general population’s faith in the system.  Repeated reports of the shelters 
in the media created an environment where taxpayers began to view the income tax as 
optional.  
The second factor, whether the standard simplifies the rules of Subchapter K, is 
achieved in at least two ways.  First, the anti-abuse regulations lessen the need of the 
Service to react to every abusive tax shelter it uncovers with yet another administrative 
                                                 
256 Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax 
Detail, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969) 
257 See Weisbach, supra note 251, at 882. 
258 Professor Weisbach uses as examples of simple rules that do not create serious problems the 
depreciation classes for assets and the rules to determine if someone is married. Id. at 883. 
 64
rule or legislative proposal to shut it down.  Furthermore, over time, it will enable 
Treasury to simplify the existing complex rules to allow simpler rules.  Indeed, this 
strategy was argued by the New York State Bar Association, the strongest proponent of a 
general anti-abuse standard.259  The underlying thought is that the presence of a standard 
to back up specific rules allows the rules to be less detailed.260  To the extent that this is 
done, it would be a clear benefit to the system. 
As to the third factor, anti-abuse standards create uncertainty by casting doubt on 
certain transactions that literally comply with the terms of the statute, and the partnership 
anti-abuse regulations are no exception.  In addition to the reverse engineered 
transactions that Treasury targeted, some legitimate transactions have been placed in 
jeopardy.  The uncertainty is only partially mitigated by the elimination of any doubt 
about the applicability of the business purpose and economic substance doctrines to 
Subchapter K.  In our view, however, the net increase in uncertainty is a price worth 
paying in order to reassert the applicability of the judicial doctrines as a backstop to the 
abuse of complex rules.  
 The fourth factor addresses the standard’s effectiveness.  At this time, the anti-
abuse regulations are not effective.  The vitriolic outcry of the tax bar against the 
regulations, coupled with the Service’s statement that its agents will not assert the 
regulations without the approval of the National Office,261 left the lasting impression that 
the regulations were not valid.  It is our understanding that many practitioners do not take 
                                                 
259 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 10, at 236; see Weisbach, supra note 251, at 882 (“A 
better approach would have been to propose the partnership anti-abuse rule in exchange for the repeal of 
the many complex rules.”). 
260 Indeed, this was precisely the strategy taken by Treasury when it promulgated the final regulations 
under I.R.C. § 752 (Thompson 2004).   
261 Ann. 94-87, 1994-27 I.R.B. 124 (1994). 
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these regulations as seriously as we believe they should.  In drafting tax shelter opinion 
letters, for example,  tax advisors have not included a thoughtful application of the 
regulations or even the judicial doctrines to transactions involving tax shelters.262   
Although we have demonstrated that the anti-abuse regulations are valid, this 
article may not change the perception of the entire tax bar.  Treasury needs to focus the 
attention of the bar once again on these regulations and declare its intention to apply 
them.263  It also needs to change immediately the standards of practice for tax advisors 
engaged in rendering tax shelter advice.  The IRS should require tax advisors to explicitly 
take into account the regulations as well as the various judicial doctrines in the legal 
analysis provided to tax shelter investors. 
We have two recommendations.  First, the IRS should not permit tax advisors to 
assume that a business purpose or economic substance exists in opinions that they render 
                                                 
262 See Johnston, supra note 128 (describing testimony of tax shelter attorney that his opinion letter 
assumed underlying economics of the transaction); Shearman Letter, supra note 127 (assuming economic 
substance and concluding the validity of the tax shelter with no legal analysis). 
263 Since the regulations are not artfully drafted, the IRS should also consider a significant redraft.  For 
example, one of the most glaring deficiencies is the regulations’ failure to provide more guidance on the 
abuse-of-entity standard.  The abuse of entity regulation allows the Service to disregard a partnership if 
“appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”  Treas. Reg. 
1.701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1995).  This does not offer a clear standard to determine whether, for a 
particular provision, a partnership should be treated as an aggregate or an entity.  As Professor Gunn has 
noted, the “rule [is] expressed in terms of what the Commissioner can do, rather than of what the right rule 
should be.”  Alan Gunn, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters: The Use and 
Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 172 
(2001).  If one were to extract a general standard from these regulations, at least two possibilities suggest 
themselves.  First, one might discern that there is a strong bias in favor of aggregate treatment and that 
entity treatment should be restricted to only those situations where it would clearly more appropriate.  This 
is the position of Alfred D. Youngblood and Deborah B. Weiss, Partners and Partnerships—Aggregate vs. 
Entity Outside of  Subchapter K, 48 TAX LAW. 39, 39 (Fall 1994) and AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K  5, 523–32 (1984).  Second, since the only explicit power the 
Commissioner is granted is to require aggregate treatment when appropriate, one might discern that the 
default rule is that of entity treatment.  This would be a disaster because it would allow taxpayers to use 
partnerships to reverse-engineer transactions.  We believe that the IRS should explicitly adopt the first 
approach.   
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for tax shelters. 264  This is a common practice by tax advisors that allows them to obscure 
the threat to the shelter raised by the judicial doctrines and anti-abuse regulations in their 
letter opinions.265  The IRS should require tax advisors to apply the judicial doctrines and 
the anti-abuse regulations to the transaction’s economic facts and predict a court’s likely 
conclusion about the outcome of such application.266  That is, rather than assume 
economic substance, the regulations should require the advisor to review the economics 
of the transaction, including all fees that will be paid, to explain why the transaction has 
economic substance under existing judicial doctrines and applicable anti-abuse 
regulations.  If the advisors are assuming economic facts, such as profit potential, based 
on the conclusions of experts, the advisors should have to explain the conclusions and 
any assumptions made by the experts in reaching the conclusions. 
Adopting this first recommendation would provide several benefits.  An analysis 
that applies the judicial doctrines to the economic facts of the tax shelter will alert 
                                                 
264 For this purpose, we would use the current definition in I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (Thompson 2004), 
which defines a tax shelter  as: 
 (I)  a partnership or other entity, 
 (II)  any investment plan or arrangement, or 
 (III)  any other plan or arrangement, 
if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of 
Federal income tax. 
265 See Johnston, supra note 127; Shearman Letter, supra note 127. 
266 In 2000, the IRS considered imposing such a requirement in certain circumstances in Circular 230, but 
postponed action on the proposal.  2002 T.D. 4011 (July 26, 2002).  The postponement was well advised 
because the proposal was too narrow. The proposed amendment to Circular 230 (the regulations that 
control the standard of practice before the IRS) would have required analysis of the judicial doctrines only 
in opinions that would be used by someone other than the advisor to promote tax shelters (Prop. Reg.-
111835-99 §10.33(b)(4)), and that concluded that favorable tax treatment was not likely. Prop. Reg.-
111835-99 §10.33(a).  If the advisor concluded that favorable tax treatment was likely, the advisor would 
not have to provide analysis of the judicial doctrines.  Given the importance of the advisor’s opinion in 
marketing a tax shelter, the Proposed Regulation had the unintended effect of increasing the pressure on 
advisors to render favorable opinions.   
 On December 30, 2003, the IRS proposed new amendments to Circular 230 that would require a 
tax advisor to avoid making unreasonable factual assumptions and to “relate the law (including potentially 
applicable judicial doctrines) to the relevant facts.”  Prop. Reg. 122379-02 §§ 10.33 and 10.55 (Dec. 30, 
2003).  The proposed amendment would also require the advisor to avoid relying on factual representations 
that the advisor knew or should have known was incorrect or incomplete. Id.  As discussed in note 270, 
infra, we believe that the proposed amendment can be improved.   
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taxpayers more fully to the tax risks posed by the tax shelter and may deter them from 
participating in it.  Such an analysis may also make it more difficult for corporate 
taxpayers to argue that they reasonably believed the tax treatment to be correct because 
application of law to the facts would necessarily involve a discussion of arguments 
against favorable tax treatment.   
Similarly, requiring the tax opinion to describe the conclusions and assumptions 
of experts upon which the opinion is relying will help to expose weaknesses in the 
opinion.  For example in the Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States case, 
discussed above,267 the tax shelter opinion assumed that the transaction had “meaningful 
pre-tax profit” without even a cursory discussion of the economic substance doctrine.268  
The tax opinion referred to the conclusion of an expert that computers leased in the tax 
shelter to third parties would have a significant residual value at the end of the lease term.  
The opinion did not, however, mention that the expert had assumed that the value of the 
computers would depreciate in value at a rate of only 25 percent per year, a rate that the 
IRS argued was significantly lower than the decline in value of 50 percent per year that 
normally occurred.269  Had the lawyers been required to explain the expert’s assumptions, 
it is likely that they would have structured the transaction so that it clearly possessed 
economic substance.270 
                                                 
267 See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
268 Shearman Letter, supra note 127 (admitted into evidence in Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United 
States, Case No. 3:01cv 1290 (JBA) (D. Conn. 2003)). 
269 United States Trial Memorandum 110-111 for Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, Case No. 
3:01cv 1290 (JBA) (D. Conn. 2003). 
270 We believe that our approach of requiring the advisor to describe the expert’s analysis and assumptions 
is preferable to the amendment to Circular 230 that the IRS proposed on December 30, 2003.  See supra 
note 266. The proposed amendment suggests that the advisor can rely on the representations of experts 
unless they have reason to know or should have known that they are unreasonable.  Our approach of 
requiring the advisor to explain the expert’s conclusions and the assumptions that underlie those 
conclusions in the tax shelter opinion will make it much more likely that the advisor will discover 
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 Second, the IRS should clarify the definition of substantial authority for purposes 
of the tax penalty under § 6662.271  Recall that the regulations state that a “. . . taxpayer 
may have substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned 
construction of the applicable statutory provision.”272  The IRS should change the 
regulation to make clear that such “well-reasoned” construction requires that the 
transaction satisfy the judicial doctrines (business purpose, economic substance and the 
other substance-over-form doctrines) and  applicable anti-abuse regulations.  If the 
transaction does not satisfy the judicial doctrines, literal compliance with the statute 
should not, by itself, stand as substantial authority.  This recommendation, like the first, 
will require an advisor to apply the judicial doctrines to the economic facts of the 
transaction and, as a result, provide benefits similar to the first recommendation. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 In this article, we determine that the ascendancy of textualism has affected the 
practice of tax law and has contributed to the recent tax shelter crisis.  The textualist 
method of statutory interpretation makes it much easier for an attorney to write a 
favorable legal opinion that will be used to market a tax shelter for two reasons.  First, 
textualism permits the attorney to ignore or reduce the importance of legislative history 
that would argue against the desired tax results.  Second, textualism challenges the 
validity of applying various judicial doctrines to complex statutory provisions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
weaknesses in the expert’s conclusions.  Moreover, such disclosure will enable the taxpayer to formulate its 
own view as to whether the expert’s conclusions are reasonable.  This will in turn impair the ability of 
corporate taxpayers to avoid the penalty under § 6662 by  arguing that they reasonably believed the tax 
treatment to be correct. 
271 See supra notes 131–143 and accompanying text for a discussion of I.R.C. § 6662 (Thompson 2004). 
272 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2003).  See supra notes 131–143 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the penalty provisions. 
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 Tax shelter promoters have used textualism to exploit the particularly detailed and 
complex provisions of Subchapter K.  The partnership anti-abuse regulations responded 
to this challenge by reasserting the application of the judicial doctrines, expanding the 
doctrines’ scope, and designating that the purposivist method be used to interpret 
partnership tax provisions.  The regulations triggered an unprecedented furor within the 
tax bar, however.  Critics claimed the regulations were inappropriate and invalid.  To the 
contrary, we conclude that the regulations are an appropriate response to textualism.  
They allow Treasury to use broad standards to administer the tax law rather than rely 
solely on a collection of narrow rules that must be constantly changed in a hopeless 
attempt to keep pace with the latest tax gimmick.  Moreover, we believe that the 
regulations are a valid exercise of Treasury’s administrative authority.   
 We suggest that adoption of the anti-abuse regulations, by itself, however, will 
not solve the tax shelter problem.  Treasury needs to refocus the bar’s attention on the 
regulations by declaring its intention to apply them to all questionable transactions.  In 
addition, we believe that Treasury should require advisors in tax shelter opinions to apply 
the anti-abuse regulations as well as the judicial doctrines to the actual economic facts of 
the transaction.  Where the advisor is assuming economic facts, such as profit potential, 
based on the conclusions of experts, the advisor should have to describe the expert’s 
conclusions and any assumptions that underlie those conclusions. 
